Poland and Romania Compete for 5,000 US Troops Withdrawn From Germany

The transatlantic security compact is fraying unevenly, country by country. Washington's decision to pull 5,000 troops from Germany and cancel a brigade rotation to Poland has triggered not European solidarity but a competitive scramble — governments bidding against each other for American favor while their own publics grow hostile to the entire arrangement.

The Scramble for American Boots

Poland and Romania are both lobbying Washington to host the withdrawn troops. At the Bucharest Nine summit on May 13 (a coordination forum of NATO's eastern flank states), Romanian President Nicușor Dan declared his country wants "as many American soldiers as possible" (Agerpres). Polish President Nawrocki echoed: "Poland is ready to receive these troops" (Brussels Signal). No joint proposal exists. An analysis in the Eurasia Review warned that this bilateral competition risks being "disastrous for the image of the Eastern Flank" (Eurasia Review).

The Pentagon has not decided where the troops go — or whether they stay in Europe at all. An official told reporters that no final allocation has been made (Digi24). Washington sent only an under-secretary to the B9 summit, not a cabinet principal. The signal was hard to miss: bilateral deals matter more to this administration than multilateral forums.

Germany's Missile Gap

Berlin faces a different bind. Chancellor Merz's government submitted a formal request to buy 400 Tomahawk missiles last July. Ten months later, the Pentagon has not responded. Defense State Secretary Müller declined to confirm whether Washington had even acknowledged the letter (Defense News).

Separately, on May 18, the State Department approved an $11.9 billion naval combat systems package for Germany — radar and fire control systems (Ground News). The two procurement tracks are unrelated, moving at different bureaucratic speeds. But the contrast is hard to ignore: billions in naval electronics cleared while the strategic missiles Berlin actually requested sit unanswered.

Germany's fallback is ELSA, a European long-range strike program developed with Britain. When pressed on whether it could deliver before 2030, officials refused to commit. Analysts note ELSA could become "a political brand, a procurement club, or a genuine European defense structure" — its governance remains undefined (ESUT).

Fractures Inside Governments

The scramble for US favor is fracturing domestic governments too.

In Poland, President Nawrocki told Trump on May 3 that Poland would welcome the withdrawn troops. Prime Minister Tusk accused Nawrocki of "throwing mud at his own country" by suggesting the government was failing on security (Rzeczpospolita). The National Security Bureau revealed it received no advance information from the Defense Ministry about the rotation cancellation (Radio ZET). Poland's cohabitation — a president and prime minister from rival parties — has become a security liability.

In Italy, the fracture runs between the defense and economics ministries. Defense Minister Crosetto is pushing to meet NATO spending targets while Economy Minister Giorgetti insists energy bills come first (Askanews). That budget fight plays out against a public that has largely turned against the alliance: Italian trust in Trump's America has fallen to 17%, below China and Russia, according to polling covered by multiple European outlets (L'Unità, Euractiv).

Hungary alone refused to sign the B9 joint declaration, which named Russia "the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security." Budapest's footnote: the "incoming Hungarian Government" will decide later (Norwegian Government). The new Tisza government promises to be a "valued Western ally" but continues hedging on every concrete commitment — no weapons for Ukraine, no participation in EU joint borrowing for defense (Világgazdaság).

The Test That Hasn't Come Yet

The NATO summit in Ankara this July will determine whether the withdrawn troops stay in Europe or go home. But the deeper structural question sits further down the road. Multiple allied governments are now discussing defense budgets of 4-5% of GDP. None of them has yet faced voters while cutting social programs to pay for it. Competition to save the alliance is hollowing it out — and the electoral reckoning for the costs hasn't even begun.