Russian ships linked to 144 drone incursions

Late last year, unidentified drones appeared over three air bases in the Netherlands and Belgium: Volkel, Eindhoven, and Kleine-Brogel. All three store US nuclear warheads under NATO's nuclear-sharing programme, where allied countries host American weapons that would only be used with US authorisation. That makes them among the most sensitive military sites in Western Europe. A new assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argues these flights fit a wider pattern: 144 reported drone incidents across 13 European countries between August 2024 and February 2026, which IISS judges highly likely to be part of a Kremlin-directed campaign (IISS, New York Times).

The pattern is plausible. The proof is not public.

Shadow Fleet, Double Use

IISS points to Russia's shadow fleet: the tankers and cargo ships that use murky ownership and flags of convenience to move Russian oil past EU sanctions. The same opacity that hides oil shipments would make these vessels useful for deniable operations. IISS names two ships, Hav Dolphin and Seasons 1, linking them to drone episodes near UK and German military sites (BBC, Spiegel). The Dutch and Belgian sightings reportedly coincided with Russian-linked vessels going dark — switching off tracking transponders — in the North Sea (Guardian).

German federal police and Belgian forces searched Hav Dolphin and found nothing conclusive (t-online). No government has released radar tracks, RF intercepts, or recovered drone hardware tying a specific aircraft to a specific ship. IISS has produced an intelligence-style assessment, not a forensic dossier.

The Hard Part Is Where the Ship Is

Whether Europe can act depends on geography, measured in nautical miles. Inside territorial waters (roughly 22 km from the coast), a state has full sovereignty. A ship launching drones there loses its right to innocent passage, the legal principle that lets foreign vessels transit peacefully without interference, and can be stopped (UNCLOS).

Beyond that line, in the exclusive economic zone or on the open sea, the rules flip. The ship answers to whatever country's flag it flies. A merchant vessel sitting just outside territorial waters is extremely hard to board on suspicion alone, even when intelligence agencies believe it carried drones minutes earlier. Europe may suspect the ship, but suspicion does not give police a clean boarding power.

The EU's strongest tools work at chokepoints, not at sea. The Council of the EU (where member-state ministers make binding decisions) has sanctioned hundreds of shadow-fleet vessels across its 16th and 17th sanctions packages, denying them port access and maritime services (Council 16th, Council 17th). NATO shares intelligence and coordinates deterrence, but says primary responsibility for countering hybrid threats sits with the targeted nation (NATO). A drone over a Dutch air base is, first, a Dutch problem.

Ready, Fragmented, or Guessing

National readiness varies sharply. Finland is closest to being prepared. Its Border Guard, which doubles as a defence asset, is receiving €44 million for counter-drone systems along the eastern border and coast, including jammers and interceptor drones (Yle). Finland also leads a Baltic maritime surveillance operation using unmanned aircraft and satellite tracking (Rajavartiolaitos).

Germany is fragmented. Security for civilian infrastructure belongs to the Länder (federal states). The coast guard is a coordination structure, not a single agency. Constitutional limits on domestic military deployment mean the Bundeswehr can track a drone but cannot easily shoot it down outside narrowly defined circumstances (Art. 87a GG).

Denmark offers a different caution. After drone reports near Copenhagen airport, police reviewed radar, CCTV, and witness evidence and could not confirm that drones were actually present. The political rhetoric had moved considerably faster than the evidence supported (Berlingske, Ground News).

Europe can often see the pattern. It cannot yet reliably stop it. And in some cases, it cannot yet prove the pattern is real.