Sulyok signs law ending his Hungarian presidency

Tamás Sulyok promulgated a constitutional amendment that terminates his own presidency. Hungary's Parliament passed the change by 139 votes to 6, and Sulyok put his signature on the document that removes him from office the day after it enters into force (Telex, Euractiv). The procedure was legal. The act was extraordinary. Europe now has to judge whether Prime Minister Péter Magyar is restoring checks and balances, or normalising another form of supermajority rule.

The Tool and Its Builder

Hungary's president is chosen by Parliament, not by voters. Presidential power tracks parliamentary arithmetic. Magyar's TISZA party holds a constitutional supermajority, so the outcome was never in doubt. Because Magyar has the votes, the real issue is precedent.

The amendment does more than remove one person. It also forces Constitutional Court judges over 70 into retirement, clearing seats filled during the Orbán era (G4Media). Magyar gave Sulyok an ultimatum before the vote: sign, or face formal removal proceedings (TVN24).

Sulyok called the amendment "unprecedented and shameful," then signed anyway. His reasoning: a constitutional act adopted through proper legislative procedure left him no legal basis for refusal (Denník N). He could have referred it to the Constitutional Court, but only for procedural review. Substantive review of constitutional amendments was abolished in 2013, by the Orbán government itself (Telex).

The irony is structural: Magyar dismantles Orbán's institutional system using the supermajority logic Orbán invented. The method looks like the majoritarian constitutional engineering he says he is undoing.

Why Neighbours Read It Differently

Poland recognised the situation immediately. Donald Tusk's government faced the same Orbán-era institutional locks after defeating PiS, but lacked a constitutional majority to break them. Magyar has one and is moving fast. Rzeczpospolita framed this as voters choosing "a change of regime," not merely a change of government (Rzeczpospolita). DW warned that Hungary shows both the advantage of speed and the risk that speed replaces standards (DW).

Slovak coverage posed the sharpest version of the dilemma. Denník N asked whether an "occupied" state can be repaired through extraordinary constitutional instruments without repeating the majoritarian logic being fought (Denník N). Ta3 reported critics describing the amendment as ad hoc rule-changing against a specific person, the same charge once levelled at Orbán (ta3).

German-language coverage cared less about Sulyok personally. Berlin's interest lies in whether Magyar's government changes Hungary's behaviour in the Council (where EU member states take collective decisions, often requiring unanimity on foreign policy). Budapest has blocked Ukraine-related sanctions and aid for years. Whether it stops is a more consequential question than who holds the presidency (SRF).

What It Doesn't Unlock

Removing Sulyok does not release Hungary's frozen EU funds. The Council's 2022 conditionality decision suspended 55% of commitments under three cohesion-policy programmes for rule-of-law breaches affecting the EU budget (Council of the EU). The Commission monitors institutional checks and balances as a core rule-of-law category (European Commission), which makes the amendment relevant to Brussels' assessment. But relevance is not a trigger. Verifiable reforms in anticorruption, procurement transparency, and judicial independence remain the conditions for fund release.

The amendment shifts Hungary's political climate without changing its compliance file. The Commission cannot reward anti-Orbán intent; it has to judge whether institutional guarantees now exist that did not exist before. Magyar has shown he can dismantle the old system. He has not yet shown he is building one that constrains his own power.