Belgium Threatens Frigate Exit

Belgium went into a joint frigate programme with the Netherlands on the premise that smaller NATO navies could get better ships, at better value, by buying together. It was the sort of European defence co-operation that looks tidy on paper: shared needs, shared ships, shared costs.

Now Belgium's defence minister, Theo Francken, has given The Hague and the Dutch shipbuilder Damen until October to fix the project or face a Belgian exit. The reported cost per ship has more than doubled to about €1.3 billion (RTBF), while first delivery has slipped to 2033 (Le Soir). The lesson is an uncomfortable one for Europe’s renewed enthusiasm for pooled defence buying: if you are the junior partner, you need more than trust when the contract starts to drift.

Who runs the contract, who just pays

The Belgian-Dutch naval arrangement splits responsibility by ship type. Belgium leads the minehunter replacement programme. The Netherlands leads the frigate replacement. In practice, the lead country manages the industrial relationship, holds the contract, and deals with the shipyard. The partner country pays its share and waits for the ships, but it is not the one sitting opposite the builder when the hard calls are made.

That can work when the programme stays on course. The Belgian-led minehunter project has avoided this kind of rupture. The vessel Tournai is preparing for sea trials, and older ships are already being transferred to Bulgaria (Army Recognition, Baird Maritime). Twelve vessels, built by Naval Group, are on schedule (Naval Group).

The Dutch-led frigate project has gone the other way. In June 2023, the Dutch defence ministry signed a contract with Damen for four anti-submarine frigates, two for each navy (Dutch Defence).

What went wrong, and what it costs

According to NRC, the problem began with the design. The weapons and sensors no longer fit the planned hull. Once the hull grows, the rest of the ship changes with it: propulsion, stability, weight, integration, and finally cost.

That is where the politics become combustible. Francken says the price has risen from roughly €600 million per ship. Belgian outlets report it could reach €1.8 billion in 2022 prices (RTBF). These are ministerial claims and press reports rather than audited contract figures. Even so, the lower end still points to a doubling.

The delay matters as much as the bill. A 2033 delivery would leave Belgium’s ageing Leopold I and Louise-Marie frigates close to retirement with no certain replacement. Around 2030, Belgium could find itself without a single deployable escort ship, just as NATO is pressing European navies to provide more anti-submarine capacity in the Atlantic and the North Sea.

The market is not empty, but available capacity is

Francken says he wants alternative offers from French, German, Spanish, Italian and Turkish yards by October. That sounds like a buyer looking for options. The harder truth is that Europe’s frigate yards are already busy.

France’s Naval Group has its FDI frigate in serial production, but its Lorient yard is booked into 2034 (franceinfo). Spain’s Navantia has just laid the third keel for its F-110 class, but those ships are still entering Spanish service (La Voz de Galicia). The problem is not that Belgium cannot find another design. It is that finding a free production slot may be much harder.

Walking away also carries its own risk. Germany recently cancelled its own frigate programme with Damen as prime contractor and shifted towards rival TKMS. That move has already produced accusations of wrongful termination and possible claims running into the billions (Zeit, NZZ). Cancelling a defence contract is rarely a clean break. It can become a second project, fought through lawyers.

The trap

Belgium has three poor choices. It can stay with Damen and swallow the overruns, while accepting a gap in its frigate fleet. It can leave, risking termination costs, lost time and a new queue at another yard. Or it can use the search for alternatives as leverage, hoping the Netherlands can force Damen back towards a deliverable plan.

What has not been shown publicly is how much of the failure sits with Damen, how much with Dutch programme management, and how much with evolving Belgian-Dutch requirements. Without that breakdown, Belgium’s October decision will be made with only part of the picture.

The minehunter programme shows joint procurement can work. The frigate programme shows the condition attached: both partners need to know who can stop the contract, who pays when it slips, and what happens if the lead country loses control. Belgium did not secure those answers clearly enough. Every European government now talking about pooled defence buying should ask Francken’s question before signing, not after.