Congress moves to block $700M Turkish engine sale

The US government notified Congress on 24 June of a plan to sell General Electric F110 engines to Turkey for its homegrown KAAN fighter jet, a deal worth roughly $700 million according to ProtoThema. Days later, Democratic Representative Dina Titus introduced a resolution to block it.

The fight looks narrow. But it forces Washington into a choice that matters across Europe: use defence exports to keep Turkey tied to Western supply chains, or enforce the punishment imposed when Ankara bought Russia's S-400 air-defence system. Each answer reshapes a different ally's security position.

What Congress can actually do

The US sells weapons to allies through Foreign Military Sales, its government-to-government arms channel. After notification, Congress can try to stop the deal. Titus used the available procedure: a joint resolution of disapproval, which triggers a vote on whether to block a notified sale (ProtoThema, CRS).

That tool sounds decisive. It rarely is. The resolution must pass both the House and Senate. The president can veto it. Overriding a veto requires two-thirds in both chambers (CRS). Congress almost never reaches that bar. Its real power is indirect: forcing debate, raising the diplomatic cost, and shaping what deals an administration proposes next.

The engine sale and any future F-35 return sit on different timelines. KAAN is still a prototype that cannot become a credible fighter without engines, supply-chain access, and years of testing (El Confidencial). Restoring Turkey's F-35 access would be a much bigger trust decision, reversing Ankara's 2019 expulsion from the programme. No formal F-35 notification for Turkey appears in the public DSCA record.

The S-400 trap

Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 missile system is the unresolved anchor. Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 programme in 2019, arguing that Russian air-defence equipment near F-35 operations could expose the jet's stealth capabilities (White House). In December 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey's defence-procurement authority under CAATSA (the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a law penalising significant defence deals with Russia) (State Department).

Those sanctions created a credibility problem. If Washington now approves advanced exports without a verified S-400 resolution, it signals that sanctions are negotiable when an ally is strategically useful enough. Greek and Cypriot critics press this point: the case for blocking is about whether enforcement means anything while the S-400 issue remains unresolved (Capital, CNA).

Europe reads the same file from different starting points

European allies don't share one Turkey policy because they don't bear the same risks.

Greece watches through an airpower lens. Athens has acquired 18 Rafale fighters from France and secured US approval for up to 40 F-35 aircraft (Dassault Aviation, DSCA). While Turkey remains locked out of the F-35, Greece holds an airpower advantage. If Ankara regains access, that edge narrows.

Germany starts from Turkey's usefulness to NATO. Ankara fields the alliance's second-largest military, controls the Bosporus, and has supplied Ukraine with drones (FAZ). German reporting treats engines for KAAN as a narrower concession than F-35 access, which remains a harder trust question (merkur.de).

Spain adds a revealing angle. After the Franco-German-Spanish future combat aircraft project (FCAS) hit serious trouble over design authority and workshare disputes, Madrid explored preliminary contacts about KAAN, though reporting noted the aircraft is too immature for Spain's carrier-aviation needs (El Confidencial). The interest doesn't validate KAAN as an alternative. It shows how trouble in Europe's own fighter programmes makes even prototypes politically useful as bargaining chips.

What hasn't happened yet

No verified S-400 disposal plan has surfaced. No formal F-35 notification for Turkey exists. No detailed Turkish proposal for resolving the 2019 expulsion conditions has appeared publicly (Haberler, Jerusalem Post).

Without those, the engine fight is a skirmish before the larger F-35 decision. The tethering argument carries real weight: US engines would keep Turkey inside Western supply chains and give Washington ongoing leverage. The opposing case is just as strong — weakening CAATSA teaches every ally that sanctions can be waited out. Whether Titus's resolution passes or not, its function is to raise the price of any future F-35 move and force Washington to decide which signal matters more, the one received in Athens or the one received in Ankara.