Dutch envoy confronts €360bn China trade gap

Sjoerdsma went to Beijing to lower the temperature, while keeping one foot on a harder European problem. The Netherlands sent its first ministerial commercial mission to China since 2018, EFE reported via Infobae, after the Nexperia fight showed where Europe’s China risk now sits: inside the parts that keep factories running.

Nexperia is a Dutch chipmaker owned by China’s Wingtech, and its components go into cars, industrial equipment and electronics, The Economist reported. Control over the company is therefore more than a flag-on-the-building issue. If The Hague blocks production skills or decisions from shifting to China, Beijing can still squeeze the flow of parts European manufacturers need.

Cheap Parts Can Carry A High Cost

The trade numbers show the pull. DW and CNBC cited 2025 figures of about €199.6bn in EU exports to China and about €559.4bn in imports from China, leaving a goods deficit near €359.8bn (DW, CNBC). A goods deficit is the gap between what Europe sells and buys. It does not prove cheating, but it shows how many European business models now depend on Chinese supply.

The problem sharpens when imports are batteries, chips, magnets, steel, solar equipment and machinery. Cheap Chinese production cuts costs for European buyers today. It also takes orders from European producers. With fewer orders, factories invest less, spread fixed costs such as plant and equipment bills over fewer units, and become more expensive just when Europe wants them to grow.

That is why the Dutch trip matters beyond a quieter bilateral meeting. The Netherlands needs open trade because ports, logistics and high-tech suppliers are central to its model. Brussels needs pressure it can actually use: tariffs, the taxes charged on imports, and probes into subsidies, meaning state support that can let firms sell below rivals’ costs.

The Same Calm Helps And Hurts

Germany shows why calmer ties still have value. Its carmakers and machinery firms use China as both market and source of parts and materials, while Chinese firms now compete with them in electric cars, batteries and industrial equipment. Porsche’s China sales fell 28% in 2024, Automobil Produktion reported, and Reuters/MarketScreener cited an EU-funded chip report warning that Europe depends on China for critical materials and on the US for key technologies (MarketScreener).

German industry gains when parts keep moving. It loses if cheap imports make European factories, suppliers and skills less viable over time. Calm helps the current business model; it can also delay the work needed to reduce dependence.

Poland shows the pressure on producers more starkly. Rzeczpospolita, citing GUS, reported 2025 exports of 13.2bn zloty to China and imports of 232.4bn zloty from China; Business Insider, citing Eurostat, put Poland’s Q1 2026 negative balance with China at €8bn, around 3.75% of quarterly GDP, the economy’s output for that quarter (Rzeczpospolita, Business Insider). Cheap Chinese inputs can keep costs low for factories in Poland, Czechia or Slovakia. Cheap finished goods can also undercut local makers of parts, appliances, steel and batteries.

Europe Still Wants Chinese Speed

Spain explains why Europe cannot simply shut the door. Gotion’s Valladolid battery project received €138.2mn from Spain’s PERTE VEC programme, while claims of about €950mn in investment and work starting in 2027 remain project announcements, El País and Castilla y León Económica reported. Chinese investment money looks attractive when Europe wants battery factories quickly. The risk is that Europe hosts the plant while key choices about chemistry, software and sourcing stay elsewhere.

Sjoerdsma’s mission helps if it buys time for Europe to agree where Chinese supply is welcome and where control becomes dangerous. It becomes costly if every exposed capital strikes its own bargain: Dutch logistics, German autos, Polish factories, Spanish batteries. Beijing does not need a formal trade war if it can offer calm where Europe needs parts, investment where Europe needs factories, and pressure where one government blocks a deal. Europe’s problem is whether temporary quiet becomes common bargaining power or turns dependence into separate deals with Beijing.