Hormuz LNG transits plunge to two per week

Brent crude jumped from roughly USD 70 to USD 79–80 per barrel in days (Süddeutsche Zeitung). LNG carrier transits through the Strait of Hormuz dropped from 13 in one week to two (Lloyd's List). Over 30% of global seaborne crude passes through the narrow channel between Iran and Oman. Nobody has formally closed it. But the route is becoming commercially unusable.

On July 8, Trump declared the 60-day US-Iran deal dead and Washington revoked Iran's temporary oil-sales waiver after further tanker attacks. US Central Command launched fresh strikes on Iranian targets, which NATO's Mark Rutte called "absolutely necessary".

The memorandum signed on June 17 was supposed to buy time for sanctions and nuclear talks. It never delivered what shipowners needed: safe voyages, affordable insurance, and banks willing to process the trade. A deconfliction hotline agreed in Switzerland went untested.

On June 25, the Singapore-flagged Ever Lovely was hit near Oman. The US struck Iranian coastal targets the next day. Iran retaliated against Gulf bases on June 27. Each round narrowed the gap between ceasefire and open hostilities. For Europe, the decisive issue is whether ships, insurers, banks and charterers treat the passage as normal. They don't.

How the Price Lands

Europe's direct crude imports from the Gulf are smaller than the headlines suggest. Germany sourced 6.1% of its crude from the Middle East in 2025 (Destatis). Spain's share was 5.5% in May 2026 (Europa Press). But benchmarks don't care about origin. When Hormuz turns risky, Brent reprices globally and every European refinery, transport firm and household absorbs it.

Gas transmits faster. German spot gas reached EUR 45.2/MWh, up from around EUR 30/MWh at the start of the year (BDEW). Gas-price volatility had already added EUR 13 billion to the EU wholesale electricity bill by mid-April (EEA).

Italy shows what substitution costs. Italian terminals received 113 LNG cargoes in the first half of 2026, 70 from the United States (MarketScreener), as Qatari supply collapsed. According to Prima Pagina News, QatarEnergy declared force majeure (meaning it claims the disruption is beyond its control) on deliveries to Italian utility Edison, cancelling 21 cargoes since April. Every replacement cargo bought on the spot market costs more.

Spain turned the shock into fiscal policy. Madrid's fuel-tax support starts at 15 cents per litre in July, with a total package costing over EUR 1.825 billion (Hacienda, Agencia Tributaria). These are national cushions. They do not make ships sail.

Who Controls What

The power hierarchy is plain. The US can tighten or ease OFAC sanctions on Iran through executive action far faster than Europe can organize a naval escort. Navies can reduce physical risk: France and the UK secured Oman's agreement on July 3 to help patrol its waters, and a multinational mine-clearance mission involving around 30 states is advancing. Italy's Meloni said Rome would not join strikes but could contribute on Hormuz in forms its parliament authorizes (Il Fatto Quotidiano).

But navies and diplomats do not decide whether commerce resumes. Insurers and banks do. Normalizing the route requires laden tankers transiting safely for weeks so war-risk premiums can fall. It requires banks to process Gulf-linked trade without fearing US sanctions exposure. Neither condition is close. Lloyd's List reports Hormuz already generating charterparty and marine-insurance disputes that will take months to unwind.

The ECB has flagged a persistent Middle East energy shock as a scenario that would raise inflation and lower growth. EU member states hold compulsory emergency oil stocks under Directive 2009/119/EC (the law requiring 90 days of reserves). But central banks cannot reopen shipping lanes, and stockpiles buy weeks, not normalcy. Europe keeps paying the premium for a strait that is politically open and commercially unreliable.