Magyar uses 141-seat supermajority to dismantle Orbán’s system

Péter Magyar took office with the same weapon Viktor Orbán spent 16 years forging: a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority. Tisza won 141 of 199 seats on 53% of the vote, under an electoral system Orbán custom-built to make Fidesz unbeatable (Verfassungsblog). The lock now turns against its maker.

That supermajority gives Magyar the power to rewrite Hungary's constitution, reverse judicial appointments, and dismantle the foundations that channelled public assets to Orbán's allies. But constitutional authority on paper matters little if the evidence is already shredded and the EU money runs out before reforms land.

Shredders, USB Drives, and Lawyers in the Ministries

Magyar's staff found 15 to 20 bags of shredded documents in the basement of the former Construction Ministry, stored alongside Fidesz campaign materials in a government building (Spiegel). He filed a criminal complaint and launched an anonymous whistleblower platform. Civil servants from multiple ministries have approached Tisza offering files on USB drives, reportedly in exchange for keeping their jobs (Forbes Hungary).

According to Hungarian media reports, Magyar has installed lawyers at the helm of key ministries with specific deadlines to audit and cancel Orbán-era contracts, including those that funnelled state wealth to politically connected foundations.

Hungary also announced it will join the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO, the EU body that investigates fraud with EU money), which Orbán refused to do. The incoming European Chief Prosecutor Andrés Ritter urged speed: "What you don't secure quickly, both evidence and criminally obtained assets, you'll hardly get later" (Sonntagsblatt). If Hungary grants EPPO retroactive jurisdiction to its 2021 founding, Orbán-era subsidy fraud becomes prosecutable at European level.

Three Months to Unlock €10.4 Billion

The European Commission froze roughly €19 billion in Hungarian EU funds under Orbán, citing rule-of-law violations. Of that, €10.4 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (the EU's post-pandemic investment fund) faces a hard cutoff: all reform milestones must be met by August 31, 2026 (XpatLoop). Magyar has three months to satisfy 27 "super-milestones" on judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement, and procurement transparency. He wants a political deal with Commission President von der Leyen by late May (Euronews).

Brussels is split on how fast to move. Six member states (Sweden, Austria, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia) demand strict proof before releasing funds. Their caution has precedent: when Poland's Donald Tusk took power in 2023, the Commission released money before judicial reforms were actually completed (Do Rzeczy).

EPP leader Manfred Weber already called for dropping Hungary's Article 7 procedure (the EU's ultimate sanction for democratic backsliding) based on Magyar's election alone, before any reforms are delivered (European Conservative). If Brussels releases funds on the strength of elections rather than proven reforms, its leverage over future rule-of-law disputes weakens.

The Resistance Inside the System

Not all of Hungary's institutions accept the new order. President Tamás Sulyok, an Orbán appointee whose term runs until 2029, rejected Magyar's May 31 resignation ultimatum, arguing there is no constitutional basis for removal. His role is mostly ceremonial, but he can refer legislation to the Constitutional Court, where Fidesz-appointed judges still hold a majority (ICONnect). Removing him requires the two-thirds vote Magyar controls, followed by a ruling from that same court. This creates a delay mechanism, not a permanent barrier.

Magyar's first foreign visits, to Warsaw and Vienna, signalled an effort to rebuild European relationships after years of Orbán's pro-Kremlin isolation. In Poland, he and Donald Tusk discussed LNG access and pipeline interconnectors to reduce Russian gas dependence (Rzeczpospolita).

His Tisza party runs on the same leader-centric logic as Fidesz. His government keeps Orbán's positions on arms to Ukraine and EU joint borrowing. Polish analysts call him a "Hungarian Tusk," but the label cuts both ways: Tusk faced criticism in Poland for wielding his own mandate selectively. Magyar governs with a party built around his personality, a constitution he can rewrite at will, and the same supermajority that made Orbán untouchable for 16 years. The tools for institutional repair and institutional capture are identical.