US halves NATO strategic bomber pledges

The US military is pulling back from Europe faster than allies expected, and the most consequential reductions sidestep the one legal constraint Congress designed to prevent exactly this. Washington is slashing the forces it pledged to NATO's crisis-planning framework: strategic bombers halved, fighters cut by a third, submarines reduced to zero. These cuts flow through executive channels that require no congressional vote, leaving European capitals scrambling to fill gaps they cannot close before 2029.

Two Channels, One Unguarded

Understanding why European officials are alarmed requires separating two kinds of American military presence. The first is troops physically stationed in Europe, around 80,000 today. Congress set a floor of 76,000 in Section 1249 of the NDAA (the annual US defense authorization bill), below which the Pentagon must certify to lawmakers that cuts won't harm allied security. This backstop gets the headlines.

The NATO Force Model carries more weight. It records what each ally commits to sending in a crisis: forces that would surge from home bases within 10, 30, or 180 days. These pledges are pure executive discretion. No statute constrains them. When Pentagon envoy Alexander Velez-Green briefed NATO officials on May 22, he presented cuts in this category: bombers halved, a third fewer fighters, zero submarines, reduced tankers and destroyers (CDE News). The Pentagon confirmed the figures but gave no timelines.

On May 30, Welt am Sonntag reported the drawdown would proceed faster than previously communicated, without the transition period European governments had assumed. A NATO diplomat told Reuters the pace "will depend on the capacity of the others to come in with alternatives," adding that "everything is not yet definitely decided, even in the U.S."

A Gap That Money Alone Cannot Close

The scale of what Europe must replace outstrips both budgets and production lines. The IISS estimated in 2025 that replicating US conventional capabilities in the Euro-Atlantic theatre would cost $226–344 billion in platforms alone, approaching $1 trillion over 25 years. The Kiel Institute's May 2026 assessment puts the price of meaningful (not full) autonomy at roughly €50 billion annually for a decade. The fighter shortfall alone requires 350–400 additional combat aircraft that European factories cannot deliver before the mid-2030s.

Two responses show how differently European capitals are adapting. France is expanding its nuclear umbrella through what it calls "dissuasion avancée" (forward deterrence), a framework where partner nations shelter under France's nuclear guarantee without any shared control over the launch decision. On May 27, Norway became the ninth country to join through the Narvik Arrangement. On the conventional side, Germany and the Netherlands are assuming command responsibility for the defence of Estonia and Latvia through their joint 1st German-Netherlands Corps, a direct transfer of Baltic defence leadership from Washington to European hands.

The 2027–2029 Window

Both moves expose the same problem: timing. Poland's chief of general staff confirmed work on indigenous deep-strike weapons but acknowledged "at least two years" before first results. The EU Institute for Security Studies warns that the cancelled Tomahawk deployment to Germany "removes a key component of Europe's deterrence" during what it calls "years of military transition." The Carnegie Endowment notes that Baltic states fear the withdrawal will come "before Europe manages to fill its defense gaps".

Every assessment converges on the same vulnerable window: 2027 to 2029, when US reductions bite hardest and European replacements remain years from delivery. The next test arrives in early June at NATO's Force Sourcing Conference, where European nations must declare which American gaps they intend to fill. Washington designed this sequence so that allies face a binary choice: commit publicly to closing gaps they cannot yet close, or arrive at the Ankara Summit in July empty-handed.