Washington targets ASML’s older chip machines

Every AI chatbot and image generator you use runs on advanced chips. Those chips can only be mass-produced using machines built by one company: ASML, based in the Dutch city of Veldhoven. Think of ASML as the sole builder of printing presses in a world that runs on books. Its lithography systems project circuit patterns onto silicon wafers with beams of extreme ultraviolet light, a technology no other firm has been able to replicate at scale. ASML reported €32.7bn in net sales for 2025 and guided €34bn–€39bn for 2026, fuelled by AI demand (ASML annual report).

That makes the Netherlands, almost by accident, one of the most strategically important countries in the AI race. And this week it walked into a contradiction that reveals how exposed Europe's position really is.

On June 23, the Netherlands joined Pax Silica, a US-led club of countries coordinating on minerals, energy, chips and data centres to keep AI supply chains among friendly nations (US State Department). The same week, Dutch trade minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma flew to Washington to lobby against a US bill that would let Congress dictate what Dutch companies can sell and to whom (Reuters). Join the alliance, fight its rules. That is Europe's bind over AI hardware.

Why a chipmaking machine becomes a weapon

Pax Silica, launched in December 2025 and since expanded to over a dozen partners including Japan, South Korea, India and several EU members, was designed by Under Secretary Jacob Helberg around a simple premise: the AI race is won not by writing better software but by controlling the physical stuff that software runs on, the processing power (what the industry calls "compute"), the minerals, the factories (Hudson Institute, Straits Times). Coordination among allies to secure those inputs addresses a real risk: supply chains that concentrate in unfriendly hands can be cut.

The problem is where coordination tips into coercion. ASML's most advanced machines, using extreme ultraviolet (EUV) light, are already blocked from sale to China under existing government rules called export controls, which restrict who may buy sensitive technology. The MATCH Act, a bipartisan bill introduced in Congress in April, would tighten the screw further (Baumgartner House release).

It would ban exports of ASML's older-generation machines too, the ones that use deep ultraviolet (DUV) light. These systems are less cutting-edge but still valuable, and thousands are already operating inside Chinese factories. The bill would also restrict servicing that installed equipment. That matters because lithography machines are not appliances you plug in and forget. They need constant expert maintenance, software updates and replacement parts from the manufacturer. Cut the service line and even sold machines eventually stop working (Tom's Hardware).

Most striking for European sovereignty: the MATCH Act would give allies 150 days to adopt equivalent restrictions. If they refuse, Washington would extend US legal authority over foreign-made products, essentially telling a Dutch company it must follow American law (Kim Senate release). The bill has passed committee but not a full vote, and TechCrunch reports it may need a larger legislative package to become law.

What Europe stands to lose

The financial exposure is immediate. China accounted for roughly 33% of ASML's 2025 sales, already dropping to 19% of net system sales in the first quarter of 2026 (SCMP, ASML Q1 2026). That revenue funds R&D for the next generation of machines. Shrink it, and Europe's ability to stay ahead in lithography weakens.

ASML is headquartered in the Netherlands, but its precision ecosystem is continental: German firms ZEISS and TRUMPF supply the optics and laser systems that make EUV work (ZEISS, TRUMPF). Restricting ASML ripples through that supplier chain. The EU Chips Act aims to double Europe's global semiconductor market share to 20% (European Commission), and Brussels officially pursues "de-risking, not decoupling" from China (EU economic security strategy). But export-control decisions still rest with individual member states. That leaves the Netherlands negotiating alone with Washington over a machine that all of Europe depends on strategically (CSDS VUB).

As Bruegel has argued, ASML's monopoly position gives Europe genuine leverage in a fragmenting chip world, but only if wielded collectively. Sjoerdsma told Washington the Netherlands shares the goal of keeping dangerous technology from hostile actors, but "cooperation by force" crosses a line (Reuters). The question is whether Europe can hold that line alone, country by country, or whether "trusted partner" quietly becomes managed dependency: higher costs, less bargaining power and weaker control over the industrial base AI will be built on.