100% tariffs shadow Hungary and Slovakia

The US Senate passed a Russia and Iran sanctions bill 86–11 on August 7, authorising tariffs of up to 100% on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. Coverage across Europe treated the vote as if the measure were already law. It isn't. The bill still needs House approval, and the House is on recess until September. After that, a presidential signature. No tariff applies to anyone until both happen.

The design of the threat matters now, though, because it points at the EU members slowest to cut Russian energy ties.

The bill ranks countries, then tariffs them

The bill does not name countries. It creates a ranking system: the president would impose duties of up to 100% on imports from whichever five countries bought the most Russian crude oil or natural gas over the prior twelve months (Congress.gov). The list gets updated every 180 days. A separate provision authorises duties of up to 500% on goods imported directly from Russia.

Countries can escape the gas list if they import less than 15% of Russia's total gas exports and are actively reducing that dependence. The president also retains waiver authority if a tariff conflicts with US national interests (CBS). Congress granted the White House a tool, not an instruction. Final tariff levels would be set by the administration, not locked in by the bill text.

Hungary and Slovakia sit in the crosshairs

Inside the EU, the most exposed countries are the ones still receiving Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline (the Soviet-era line running from Russia through Belarus into Central Europe). When Brussels banned seaborne Russian oil in 2022, it granted pipeline exemptions. Hungary and Slovakia are the two members still using them. The European Commission says it is working with both governments to diversify, but neither has presented a concrete exit date.

Hungary could plausibly land on the top-five list. But the bill asks a different question from the one Hungarians usually debate. What matters is not the Russian share of Hungary's energy mix. It is Hungary's share of Russia's total gas exports — and those are very different numbers. The gas exemption may protect Budapest on that side.

Slovakia's exposure is more straightforward. The Slovnaft refinery still processes Druzhba crude, Gazprom remains Slovakia's largest gas supplier, and the government has no replacement timeline.

Belgium is a narrower case. In July, all LNG (liquefied natural gas, shipped by tanker) arriving in Belgium was Russian. But most of that gas passes through the Zeebrugge terminal for re-export, not Belgian consumption. If the US ranking counts landed cargoes rather than final use, Belgian exporters could face tariffs for energy their country never burned. That risk hinges on how the administration defines "buyer."

Hungary takes the energy decision; Brussels handles the trade fallout

Trade policy is an exclusive EU competence under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU — only Brussels can negotiate trade terms or retaliate on behalf of member states. Hungary and Slovakia cannot strike their own deal with Washington. If a US tariff hits Hungarian or Slovak exports, Brussels inherits the response, defending countries whose Russian-energy dependence much of the bloc considers a liability.

The Senate bill works as outside pressure on a problem Brussels has not been able to solve country by country. The Commission has managed holdout members with exemptions and timetables. Washington now offers a blunter incentive: keep buying Russian energy, and your exporters pay.

That pressure is already real. Exporters in Hungary and Slovakia shipping goods to the US — cars, machinery, chemicals — now face a planning problem. Pricing contracts, delivery timing, and customs risk all shift when a 100% tariff becomes plausible, even if it has not been imposed. The EU's own sanctions tools never created that kind of commercial uncertainty.

Whether the House passes this bill remains open. But the ranking mechanism — rolling, updated every six months — means the question for Budapest and Bratislava is not just political. It is commercial, starting now.