Belgium threatens exit as frigates hit €1.3bn

Belgium's defence minister has given the Netherlands and shipbuilder Damen until October: fix the joint frigate programme, or Belgium walks. The per-ship cost has reportedly more than doubled to around €1.3 billion (RTBF), and the first delivery has slipped to 2033 (Le Soir). The programme was supposed to prove that small NATO navies buy smarter together. It is proving something else: what happens when the junior partner has no emergency brake.

Who runs the contract, who just pays

The Belgian-Dutch naval partnership divides work by ship type. Belgium leads the minehunter replacement; the Netherlands leads the frigate replacement. The lead country manages the industrial relationship, runs the contract, and makes day-to-day decisions. The partner country pays its share and receives ships, but does not sit across the table from the shipyard.

That structure works when things go well. The Belgium-led minehunter track has not produced the same rupture: the vessel Tournai is preparing sea trials, and older ships are already being transferred to Bulgaria (Army Recognition, Baird Maritime). Twelve vessels, built by Naval Group, on schedule (Naval Group).

The Dutch-led frigate track broke down. In June 2023 the Dutch ministry signed a contract with Damen for four anti-submarine frigates, two for each navy (Dutch Defence).

What went wrong, and what it costs

NRC reports a basic design problem. The weapons and sensors no longer fit the planned hull. A bigger hull changes propulsion, stability and cost. The ship grew, and the budget grew with it.

The price tag is politically explosive. Minister Theo Francken says costs have risen from roughly €600 million per ship. Belgian outlets report the figure could reach €1.8 billion in 2022 prices (RTBF). These are ministerial claims and press reports, not audited contract values. But even the lower estimates represent a doubling.

A 2033 delivery means Belgium's ageing Leopold I and Louise-Marie frigates could retire with nothing to replace them. Around 2030 Belgium may lack a single deployable escort ship, just as NATO is asking European navies to provide more anti-submarine capacity in the Atlantic and North Sea.

The market is not empty, but available capacity is

Francken says he wants alternative offers from French, German, Spanish, Italian and Turkish yards by October. France's Naval Group has its FDI frigate in serial production, but its Lorient yard is booked into 2034 (franceinfo). Spain's Navantia just laid the third keel for its F-110 class, but those ships are still entering Spanish service (La Voz de Galicia). Across Europe, frigate yards have full order books. The problem is not a lack of designs. It is a lack of open production slots.

Switching carries its own dangers. Germany recently cancelled its own frigate programme with Damen as prime contractor, pivoting to competitor TKMS. That exit has already triggered accusations of wrongful termination and potential claims running into the billions (Zeit, NZZ). Cancelling a defence contract is not a clean reset. It can become its own multi-year legal fight.

The trap

Belgium faces three bad options. Stay with Damen and absorb overruns plus a frigate gap. Leave and face termination costs, lost work, and a new supplier's production queue. Or use alternatives only as leverage, hoping the Netherlands can force Damen to deliver.

Nobody has publicly shown how much of the failure belongs to Damen, how much to Dutch programme management, and how much to changing Belgian-Dutch requirements. Without that breakdown, the October choice is being made partly blind.

The minehunter programme proves joint procurement can work. The frigate programme proves the condition: both partners need to know who can stop the contract, who pays when it slips, and what happens if the lead country loses control. Belgium didn't secure those answers. Every European government now pushing for pooled defence buying should ask Francken's question before signing, not after.