Bulgaria rejects eastern flank’s Russia warning

Seven eastern and northern European leaders signed the Gdańsk declaration on 25 June, calling Russia the most serious direct and long-term threat to their security. Bulgaria refused to sign (PISM). That refusal matters because Bulgaria is both an EU and NATO member on the Black Sea, close to Russia's war in Ukraine. It did not block any military plan or EU sanction. But it broke the appearance of a unified eastern flank weeks before the NATO summit in Ankara, and it raised a question that matters for the rest of Europe: where does political signalling end and formal decision-making begin?

A caucus that cannot compel

The Gdańsk format is not NATO acting collectively. It is a self-selecting group of states pushing both Brussels and the alliance toward a harder posture on Russia. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland and Romania signed, alongside European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius (PISM, Euronews).

The Polish Institute of International Affairs explicitly distinguishes this platform from the older Bucharest Nine (a wider grouping of eastern NATO members that includes states with more ambivalent positions on Russia, Bulgaria among them). The Gdańsk group exists precisely because the B9 could not sustain a unified threat assessment.

Europe works through layers. NATO decisions require consensus among all allies. EU sanctions need unanimity in the Council (where every member state has a veto). But smaller coalitions often form first to frame the threat and set the political agenda before those formal bodies act (NATO, Council of the EU). Gdańsk belongs to that third, informal layer. Its power is political pressure, not legal authority.

The refusal weakens the signal, not the chain of command

Bulgaria's stance did not cancel any treaty obligation or EU measure. NATO's mutual defence guarantee under Article 5 remains intact. Germany and the Netherlands were separately taking on a new command role for Estonia and Latvia ahead of the Ankara summit, showing that executable military arrangements continue regardless of a regional declaration's signature list (DW).

The cost is political. For Baltic capitals, naming Russia is not a rhetorical exercise. Estonia's foreign minister has warned against any settlement that hands exposed countries to Moscow's terms (ERR). When a Black Sea ally refuses to name the same threat, adversaries can read that as evidence that political will on the flank is uneven, even as NATO leaders acknowledge fears they may not be able to rely on US support if Russia attacks (The Guardian).

Romanian coverage framed Bulgaria's stance through President Rumen Radev's invocation of national interest, not as a trust crisis (Digi24). That framing matters: Bucharest is not treating Sofia as hostile, just unreliable on threat language.

Budapest finds cover in Sofia

Hungarian pro-government media moved quickly to absorb Bulgaria's refusal into a domestic narrative. Mandiner framed it as proof that after Viktor Orbán shifted position, another country stepped into the outlier role, arguing that vetoes are not a Hungarian speciality (Mandiner). Portfolio reported that Budapest had unexpectedly allowed progress on opening a new cluster of Ukraine's EU accession negotiations, while Bulgaria separately asked to delete language urging further chapters to open (Portfolio). Bulgaria is useful to Budapest precisely because it lets Hungary look cooperative by comparison.

The formal test ahead

The real question is whether Bulgaria carries its Gdańsk position into rooms where consensus is required. Allies were still finalising common language on Russia for the Ankara summit declaration, where all NATO members must agree (European Pravda). If Sofia blocks that language, it becomes a consensus problem. If it blocks wording in the EU Council during the next sanctions package, it becomes a veto.

Until then, Bulgaria's refusal occupies the space between disagreement and obstruction. The coalition can agree on threat language faster than it can prove every exposed state will carry that language into decisions.