Bulgarian court blocks state Lukoil seizure

Bulgaria tried to turn energy-security concerns into owner-like state control over Lukoil-linked fuel companies. Its Constitutional Court said no. The ruling matters beyond Sofia because it exposes a gap no EU member state has solved alone: sanctions can freeze Russian assets, but no common legal tool lets governments strip Russian leverage from critical refineries. Each country improvises. National courts draw the limits.

What Sofia's Court Removed

Bulgaria's "special-manager regime" let the government appoint a state-run manager with sweeping powers over Lukoil-linked companies, from controlling shares and voting rights to disposing of assets (24 Chasa). The court struck down much of that authority. It ruled that appointment decisions must be judicially reviewable and that the state cannot sell refinery assets without the owner's involvement (Blitz).

Only Lukoil Neftochim, the Burgas refinery that is Bulgaria's sole major oil refinery, remains under special management. Three other Lukoil-linked companies were removed from the regime entirely.

Sofia faces a second pressure. Bulgarian diplomats lobbied to exclude Lukoil founder Vagit Alekperov from a new EU sanctions package, arguing energy and transport interests required it (EFE). Litasco, Lukoil's trading arm, has threatened arbitration over Bulgaria's interventions, meaning the state could face a large compensation claim. The bind is clear: Bulgaria wants to manage a Russian-linked strategic asset while avoiding steps that disrupt fuel supply or trigger lawsuits.

Four Countries, Four Improvised Solutions

The political objective is shared across Europe. The legal tools are not.

Germany placed Rosneft Deutschland under trusteeship in 2022 to keep the PCK Schwedt refinery running. A trustee controls daily operations, but ownership stays with Rosneft. Berlin has no plan to buy or expropriate (Bundestag). Germany's constitution (the Basic Law) treats expropriation as requiring public purpose and full compensation (Article 14 GG). The longer the trusteeship lasts, the harder "temporary" is to defend before judges.

Italy took a different route at the ISAB Priolo refinery in Sicily. Rome placed it under temporary administration through an emergency decree, then approved a private sale to G.O.I. Energy (Gazzetta Ufficiale, Reuters). The state never took title. It supervised a market exit and sidestepped the harshest legal exposure.

Romania can review potential buyers and pressure companies through licensing, especially around the Trident offshore gas block in the Black Sea. A consortium of Arab and American investors has reportedly approached Bucharest about acquiring Lukoil assets (Economica.net). But Romania cannot simply order a sale.

Poland is a quiet beneficiary. As Schwedt shifts away from Russian crude, Polish logistics through Gdańsk and the PERN pipeline gain weight (DW).

The Gap Brussels Has Not Filled

EU sanctions can freeze assets and ban transactions, but they cannot transfer ownership of a refinery (Regulation 269/2014). The EU's investment-screening regulation coordinates national reviews of foreign buyers but leaves final decisions to each government (FDI Screening Regulation). And the EU Court of Justice (Europe's top court) has confirmed that even sanctions measures are subject to judicial review (Rosneft C-72/15). Emergency politics does not remove courts from the chain of power.

Europe shares a geopolitical problem but not a legal tool to solve it. Germany maintains a trusteeship whose proportionality weakens with each passing year. Italy engineered a clean exit through a bespoke decree. Bulgaria overreached and got pulled back by its own court. Romania waits for buyers it cannot compel to appear. Without a common EU framework that distinguishes keeping fuel flowing from taking property by another name, each government keeps improvising, each court sets different limits, and the costs of that fragmentation fall unevenly: lawsuits in one country, supply risk in another, investor flight in a third. The Commission cannot decide Bulgarian property law. It can decide whether Europe keeps leaving this problem to national improvisation.