Estonia downs drone while Romania waits

On May 19, NATO fighters shot down a drone over Estonia, the first interception in the country's history (Polsat News). The same night, Russian drones struck the Ukrainian port of Izmail, directly across the Danube from Romania. Romania scrambled two F-16s, tracked the attack on radar, and issued civilian alerts (Hotnews). It did not fire. Five days earlier, Latvia's government had collapsed after drone crashes on its territory exposed fatal gaps in air defense (Le Monde). One alliance, one threat, five different responses.

No Common Rules for Peacetime Skies

NATO has no unified peacetime protocol for shooting down drones. Its classified rules of engagement cover only NATO-tasked forces and prioritize de-escalation over kinetic response. National armed forces operating on their own soil fall outside NATO's command entirely, so each country must pass its own shoot-down legislation. Most haven't.

Romania shows what that gap looks like in practice. Bucharest passed shoot-down legislation in 2025 and authorized pilots to fire on Russian aircraft entering its airspace on May 15. Four days later, F-16s scrambled and returned without firing. Since 2022, at least 66 Russian drones have violated Romanian airspace. None has been shot down. At the B9 summit (the Bucharest Nine, a group of eastern NATO members coordinating security policy) on May 13, allies asked Romania why — no answer was given.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte acknowledged the cost absurdity at the same summit: "We cannot continue taking out $20,000 costing drones with 3 or 4 million costing missiles". Operation Eastern Sentry, launched in September 2025 after drones entered Polish airspace, provides integrated monitoring but no engagement authority.

Five Countries, Five Calculations

In Slovakia, President Pellegrini demanded urgent legislation allowing the military to intercept drones in peacetime, calling for a legal "threat state" between peace and war. Prime Minister Fico refused to convene the security council, calling it unnecessary. He had returned from Moscow two days before drones struck targets dozens of kilometers from Slovak villages.

Hungary treated drone defense as diplomatic currency. The Magyar Péter government converted attacks near Transcarpathia into leverage for an 11-point minority rights demand on Ukraine, making defense cooperation conditional on Kyiv's treatment of ethnic Hungarians (according to Euronews).

Bulgaria signed the B9 joint declaration but sent only its NATO ambassador, the lowest representation among the nine members. Days later, Sofia refused to back the Special Tribunal for Russian aggression against Ukraine, joining only Hungary, Slovakia, and Malta in abstaining (BNR).

Poland is building autonomous capacity. Its Shield East fortification program covers 260 km of the eastern border with integrated counter-drone systems (Polish Ministry of Defense), rather than waiting for NATO to agree on common rules.

What the B9 Summit Didn't Produce

The summit's joint statement called Russia the "most significant, long-term and direct threat" and pledged to work toward spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 (NATO). It produced no binding counter-drone capability targets and no common engagement rules.

Without those rules, Russia can run the same probe indefinitely. Latvia's government fell. Slovakia's leadership split. Romania absorbed violations without firing back. Hungary bargained. Bulgaria stayed quiet. Poland built walls. Russia's drone campaign is designed to produce exactly this fragmentation, and so far, it is working.