Greek gas exports triple to 8.7 TWh

Greek gas exports to Southeast Europe tripled in the first half of 2026, reaching 8.72 TWh compared with 2.86 TWh a year earlier, according to DESFA, the country's gas transmission operator (Reporter/DESFA). In May, Greece also pushed 874.2 GWh of net electricity into neighbouring grids, two-thirds of it toward Bulgaria (Serbia Energy). The volumes are real. The question is whether companies are willing to pay for long-term access to these routes.

How the gas moves

Two terminals bring LNG (liquefied natural gas, cooled into liquid for tanker shipping) into Greece. Revithoussa, near Athens, is the workhorse: it handled 18.61 TWh in the first half of 2026, covering 43% of Greek gas imports. Alexandroupolis, a newer floating unit in the northeast, is growing fast from a smaller base, processing 3.46 TWh, more than triple its year-earlier volume (Reporter/DESFA).

Once the LNG is turned back into gas, it enters DESFA's pipeline network and can cross into Bulgaria at Sidirokastro, the main border metering point. From there, operators can move it north through Romania toward Moldova and Ukraine, a route called the Vertical Corridor.

Electricity is a less durable export story. Greece exported cheaply in May because renewables (57% of generation) and hydro (8%) pushed the day-ahead price (the wholesale rate set for next-day delivery) below neighbours' costs (Serbia Energy). A summer heatwave lifts air-conditioning demand, gas-fired plants set marginal prices, and the flow can reverse within weeks. Gas pipeline contracts are stickier. That is where the structural test lies.

Who is booking capacity, and who isn't

The hardest commercial signal comes from Sidirokastro. In long-term auctions, 46% of available export capacity was booked for gas years 2026/27 through 2029/30. Metlen reserved 20 GWh/day and Atlantic SEE LNG Trade took 13 GWh/day (News247). Booking costs money, which makes it a harder signal than a political communiqué.

The commitment is uneven, though. No bidder expressed interest in Route 3 via Nea Mesimvria, a TAP-linked entry point, in the same auctions (Protothema English). Not every corridor on the map is commercially alive.

Further north, Moldova's state trader Energocom reserved winter 2026–2027 capacity at the Ungheni border point, with roughly 41% of Romanian exit capacity and 39% of Moldovan entry capacity taken (Moldova1). Romanian operators are negotiating tariff adjustments for the corridor with Brussels (Știripesurse).

Hungary remains the gap. Public Hungarian sources treat the Greek route as a technical option, not a working supply channel. The debate there stays anchored to MOL's Russian oil imports via the Druzhba pipeline and the Adriatic alternative (Telex/G7, HVG).

Who gains, who pays

Greek terminal operators, traders, and power producers gain from higher throughput and export revenue. DESFA earns transmission fees on every cubic metre crossing its network. Neighbouring governments gain bargaining leverage against existing suppliers. Croatia, expanding its Krk LNG terminal to 6.1 bcm/year capacity, rides the same diversification trend rather than losing to it (Poslovni).

Buyers face the real uncertainty. More routes improve supply security, but gas moving south-to-north accumulates costs at every border: regasification fees, transmission tariffs, transit charges, and the fees networks pay to keep supply and demand balanced. If the Greek route is more secure but more expensive after all that, households and factories in Bulgaria, Romania, or Moldova are paying a premium for diversification. Whether that premium is worth it depends on the competition, and Russian gas is not retreating. EU imports of Russian pipeline gas rose 7% year on year and Russian LNG rose 11% in the first five months of 2026, according to ACER data (Euro2day, ACER).

Greece has proved route usefulness. It has not yet proved supplier power. The difference is sustained flows at prices that beat the alternatives after every border fee is counted, and that test is only beginning.