Hegseth orders six-month review of Europe assets

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered a six-month review of every American military asset in Europe, rebranding the exercise as "NATO 3.0": a posture in which Europeans defend their own continent and Washington steps back. The review is a unilateral American process, driven by the president's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. No European government or alliance body can veto it (CBS, Le Monde). European capitals face an adjustment they must absorb.

What Washington Actually Provides

The assets reportedly under review include 50 of 150 fighter jets, all eight aerial refuelling tankers, 11 of 26 maritime patrol aircraft, a missile submarine, a carrier strike group and one of two bomber groups (Tagesspiegel). These systems provide the backbone that makes NATO's defence plans executable: air cover, surveillance, long-range strike, maritime monitoring and the capacity to reinforce Europe across the Atlantic (Al Jazeera). Losing tankers means European jets can't stay airborne long enough. Losing patrol aircraft means gaps in submarine tracking. The review targets the connective tissue of allied defence, not its visible bulk.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte tried to contain the damage, saying the review would proceed "in close consultation with allies" and that NATO's Supreme Allied Commander believes many withdrawn capabilities are already covered or soon will be (NATO). Germany's defence minister Boris Pistorius offered a blunter assessment: rapid reductions without a clear roadmap for European compensation would create "dangerous capability imbalances" (Der Spiegel, Adevărul). The distance between Rutte's reassurance and Pistorius's warning defines Europe's predicament.

Spending Up, Dependence Intact

Washington's burden-sharing argument has real evidence behind it. European allies increased core defence spending by more than $90 billion in 2025, a jump of nearly 20% in a single year (NATO). Poland leads NATO in spending as a share of national output. Romania has earmarked €16.68 billion from SAFE (Security Action for Europe, a new EU loan instrument for military procurement) for combat vehicles, anti-drone systems and ammunition (Mediafax).

Yet spending is not substitution. Between 2020 and 2024, 64% of arms imports by European NATO states came from the United States (Le Nouvel Économiste). Europe lacks the factories, components, powder and skilled labour to scale its own defence industry fast. France, Germany and Italy risk developing three separate combat-aircraft programmes instead of one, after the flagship SCAF cooperation stalled over governance and technology-sharing disputes (Le Monde). Bigger budgets channelled through US suppliers deepen the very dependence they claim to cure.

The Eastern Flank Reads It First

Warsaw is using Hegseth's pressure campaign to lobby for a permanent American base on Polish soil, with Defence Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz claiming an early positive Pentagon response (Polsat News). Even NATO's top spender by GDP share still wants America physically embedded in its defence.

Lithuania reads the risk more sharply. Experts there called a rapid US pullback a "gift to Russia," warning that the transition period itself creates vulnerability (LRT). Baltic defence planners have identified what they cannot quickly replace: long-range air defence, electronic warfare, early warning, and the logistics chains that move allied reinforcements into position.

Romania frames the gap through the Black Sea, where bases at Deveselu and Mihail Kogălniceanu anchor allied deterrence. Romanian coverage stresses that tankers, ISR drones, fighters and maritime patrol aircraft are precisely the assets Washington may no longer automatically provide (Euronews Romania).

No one outside the Pentagon has seen the actual cut list. Congress requires reporting before troop levels drop below 76,000, and House and Senate defence-spending bills are attempting to restrict major reductions (NOTUS). But the review covers capabilities, not just headcounts. Until someone publishes a capability-by-capability replacement map showing who fills which gap, when, and with what, NATO's reassurance rests on a transition timeline that Washington may not honour.