Lithuania defies Washington over Belarus potash

The United States asked Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine to let Belarusian potash flow through their territory again. All three said no. The request, delivered as an unsigned State Department "nonpaper" (an informal policy document with no official attribution) in May 2026, reveals a structural split in transatlantic sanctions policy. Washington already lifted its own restrictions on Belaruskali, the Belarusian state potash monopoly. The EU cannot follow unless all 27 member states agree. The divide is legal, not diplomatic.

Why No Single Country Can Say Yes

EU sanctions on Belarusian potash sit inside Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, a law that applies directly to every customs authority, railway operator, and port terminal across all member states (finance.ec.europa.eu). The regulation bans not just imports but transit and transport of Belarusian potassium chloride within EU territory (gov.ie). Lithuania's foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys put it plainly: as long as EU sanctions stand, "such activities cannot be carried out in Lithuania, Latvia or Poland" (LRT).

Adopting these sanctions required unanimity in the Council of the EU (where every member state must agree). Lifting them requires the same. The EU unanimously renewed Belarus sanctions in February 2026 through February 2027, explicitly maintaining potash restrictions (Mayer Brown). The nonpaper asks three countries to do something EU law does not let them do alone. Lithuanian President Nausėda said it directly: "We could not change anything even if we wanted to."

Prisoners for Potash

Washington's argument rests on a transactional logic. Since January 2025, Trump envoy John Coale has visited Minsk repeatedly, securing over 500 political prisoner releases, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova, in exchange for sequential US sanctions relief (Euronews, RFE/RL). By March 2026, Washington had fully removed Belaruskali from its sanctions list. The nonpaper proposed that European transit revenues could fund Ukraine's defense, a framing designed to make refusal feel disloyal.

The "wedge" argument, that easing sanctions could pull Belarus away from Russia, runs into hard military facts. Russia deployed its nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile system to Belarus in December 2025, the same week as the potash deal (Arms Control Association). Ukraine's foreign minister Andriy Sybiha rejected the logic: "There should be no illusions that someone, through some kind of concessions, will be able to pull Belarus out of Russia's sphere of influence" (Interfax Ukraine).

The Price of Saying No

Lithuania's refusal carries real economic weight. Belarusian potash once made up nearly a third of Klaipėda port's cargo volume. Losing it cost roughly €14 million annually in port revenue, and the terminal that handled those shipments saw income collapse from €96 million to €3.2 million (Lrytas). Poland has stayed strategically silent. Warsaw never confirmed or denied receiving the nonpaper, though its rail gauge incompatibility with Belarus provides a convenient technical barrier on top of the legal one (Rzeczpospolita).

The EU has kept escalating. The 20th sanctions package, adopted in April 2026, added new designations against Belarusian entities and raised tariffs on Belarusian potash reaching the bloc (Mayer Brown).

Ukrainian presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn named the systemic risk: "It gives Putin confidence that sanctions can be eased" (RBC-Ukraine). If a high-profile EU sectoral sanction can be unpicked through bilateral US pressure on individual capitals, the same template applies to Russian energy and financial restrictions. The next test comes in February 2027, when Belarus sanctions face their annual unanimous renewal. Any single member state can block extension. Hungary has used that leverage before on Russia packages, though under its new government led by Péter Magyar, Budapest has shifted closer to the EU mainstream.

On a separate track, Lukashenko has floated a $3 billion mine sale to US investors (Euromaidan Press). If American companies buy into Belarusian potash production, Washington's quiet request becomes a demand backed by direct commercial interest.