Merz’s CDU crashes below 5%

Friedrich Merz's Christian Democrats apparently fell below 5% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and dropped to second place in Berlin on 20 September, based on provisional results (NDR, Deutschlandfunk). Merz called the results a "catastrophe" and pledged to accelerate his reform agenda (Boursorama/Reuters). The twin defeats cannot remove him from office. They can make it harder for his government to back European commitments that cost German voters money.

Two Protests, Two Directions

In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the far-right AfD led with roughly 38%, followed by the SPD at about 35%. CDU scraped around 4.9%, which, if confirmed, would shut it out of a German state parliament (Landtag) for the first time (NDR, Rostock Heute). The SPD's minister-president Manuela Schwesig is expected to seek a coalition with smaller parties, keeping AfD and what remains of CDU out of government.

In Berlin, Die Linke (the Left party) took first place with roughly 25.5%, pushing CDU to about 20% (Deutschlandfunk, Tagesschau). According to Tagesspiegel, Die Linke drew former SPD voters, previous non-voters and younger Berliners, campaigning on implementing Berlin's 2021 referendum to socialise large housing portfolios. A Left-led coalition would replace the outgoing CDU-led city government, flipping Berlin's political alignment.

The voters punished the federal governing parties through different regional grievances, but the electoral mechanism was the same: alternatives on the flanks were available and voters took them.

Why Merz Stays, and What Tightens

Germany's Basic Law makes removal from the chancellorship nearly impossible without a simultaneous parliamentary successor. The Bundestag (the federal parliament) can only oust a chancellor by electing a replacement in the same vote (Basic Law, Art. 67). CDU/CSU and SPD still hold 328 of 630 Bundestag seats, twelve above the majority line (Bundestag).

The state results affect federal law through the Bundesrat (the upper house, where each state government casts its votes as a bloc). Berlin holds four votes; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern holds three (Bundesrat). Seven votes cannot form a blocking minority on their own. But when a state coalition's partners disagree on a federal bill, the convention is to abstain, and on laws that require Bundesrat consent (covering tax allocation, costs imposed on states and certain EU-related measures), an abstention works like a no (Bundestag, legislative procedure).

A Left-led Berlin government would replace one that backed CDU priorities. An SPD-led coalition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, likely including partners to Schwesig's left, could produce abstentions where the outgoing government supported Merz. Neither shift overturns federal policy alone. Both narrow the chancellor's ability to pass bills through the upper house.

The EU Budget as First Test

Germany keeps the same votes and vetoes in Brussels. The 2028–34 EU budget (the multiannual financial framework) requires unanimous approval among member states under Article 312 TFEU. Germany's federal government, not Merz personally, sets the negotiating position, and the SPD coalition partner shapes what that position can be.

That coalition dynamic is where the elections bite. SPD general secretary Lars Klingbeil said the government had failed to convince voters about its reform agenda (AFP). Le Monde described the results as a historic defeat for Merz's party. L'Opinion noted that Merz insisted on continuing reforms despite the setbacks. No European government has publicly linked the results to a changed German negotiating position. The plausible constraint is domestic: CDU members of parliament facing their own future elections may resist backing a larger German contribution to the EU budget or other costly commitments if voters are already punishing the party.

The elections changed none of Germany's formal powers in the EU. They raised the domestic political cost of using them. No coalition partner, caucus or European government has yet forced a policy reversal, but Merz now has less room to persuade his own side that unpopular European commitments are worth the price.