Mitsotakis seeks €60 billion for EU infrastructure

Kyriakos Mitsotakis is preparing Greece's turn chairing the Council of the EU (where national governments negotiate EU laws) with a reported €60 billion package for European networks and infrastructure, tied to the fight over the bloc's next seven-year budget for 2028-2034 (Deutschlandfunk). The ambition is to make infrastructure a label that both spending hawks and cohesion states can accept. Germany's Friedrich Merz has already called the Commission's overall budget proposal "unaffordable," and every single government must agree before a cent is allocated (TFEU Article 312).

A rotating presidency cannot write Europe's budget. It sets the agenda, chairs ministerial meetings, drafts compromise texts and decides which trade-offs get discussed together or apart (Council presidency). In a negotiation where any single country can block the whole deal, that sequencing power is real. Athens is betting that "networks" can work as common ground: transport corridors, energy links, digital infrastructure and dual-use military-civilian projects packaged under one umbrella that security-minded and development-hungry governments can both claim.

After the Recovery Money Runs Out

The timing is deliberate. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (the EU's pandemic-era investment fund) expires after 2026, with no replacement at comparable scale. Greece is especially exposed: RRF support amounted to roughly 16-17% of GDP, an investment engine about to disappear (EUobserver). Without a successor, countries that leaned on pandemic-era EU investment lose their biggest growth driver just as new budget demands mount.

The next long-term budget, known as the MFF (the EU's seven-year spending plan), has to absorb defence, Ukraine reconstruction and enlargement preparation, all under a ceiling that net contributors (countries paying more into the EU than they receive) want kept tight (Council MFF page). Greece's bet is that infrastructure can become the budget line everyone tolerates.

The Missing Blueprint

The deepest weakness in the Greek pitch is what remains unspecified. Does Athens want a larger Connecting Europe Facility (the EU's programme for cross-border transport, energy and digital projects)? Protected cohesion envelopes? New common borrowing? A post-RRF investment instrument?

Each route changes who controls the money. CEF funding favours cross-border project selection by the Commission. Cohesion policy protects national envelopes. Common borrowing triggers creditor-state resistance. Plan-based funds hand Brussels more control over disbursement. The choice also sets the veto threshold: new EU-level revenue ("own resources") requires a separate Council decision and ratification in every national parliament (TFEU Article 311). The official Greek presidency programme has not yet been published on the Council's website. What exists is political positioning, not a formal programme.

The Alliance Athens Needs

Greece is not alone. Poland wants cohesion policy protected while recasting eastern-flank railways, dual-use roads and energy interconnectors as a European strategic good (CEF, Military Mobility). Warsaw insists new security spending cannot cannibalise regional development money. Romania shares that logic but faces tighter constraints, with public debt at 63.5% of GDP and the country under the EU's excessive-deficit procedure (stricter surveillance of government spending) (European Commission EDP, ZF). Bucharest wants EU grants for Black Sea connectivity and military mobility, but resists anything requiring heavy national co-financing. For Bulgaria, the pitch is concrete: roads, ports and power links running south through Greece to the Aegean (TEN-T).

Germany and the Netherlands define the resistance. Merz's government is not against infrastructure; Berlin is pursuing its own massive domestic investment push. The objection is to funding it through a bigger EU pot. German-led member states pushed the 2027 annual budget roughly €8 billion below the Commission's proposal (Zeit), with Berlin framing its European priorities around competitiveness, not larger transfers (Bundesregierung). The Netherlands and Nordic allies remain sceptical of spending increases, though more open where defence or competitiveness arguments apply (Occitanie Europe).

Greece can shape the menu, but it cannot make others pay for the meal. The presidency matters only if Athens turns "networks" from a useful label into a financing route that both cohesion states and net contributors can defend at home.