Romania pauses $7 billion modular reactor project

Small modular reactors are nuclear's answer to a simple question: what if, instead of building one enormous custom power plant for billions, you built smaller units in a factory and shipped them to site? Think of it like the difference between hand-building a cruise liner and producing a fleet of identical ferries. Each ferry is simpler. The tenth one rolls off the line faster and cheaper than the first. That logic has made SMRs the most talked-about idea in nuclear energy for a decade.

Romania's Doicești project was supposed to prove this logic works in Europe. Instead, it is showing that the hardest part of the plan has nothing to do with reactor physics. It's a financial chicken-and-egg problem: the economics depend on repetition, but someone must pay for the expensive first unit before repetition can begin.

The first ferry is always the most expensive

The Doicești plan called for six small reactor modules on a former coal site, each producing 77 megawatts of electricity, enough combined to supply a mid-sized city with steady, round-the-clock power (Economica). The American developer, NuScale, holds the first-ever US regulatory design approval for an SMR, meaning the safety case passed (NRC). The technology, in other words, is not the bottleneck.

The money is. Romania wanted a sensible protection: buy one module first, see if it performs, then commit to the other five. NuScale, according to Romanian reporting, did not agree to that risk-sharing structure, and the framework agreement stayed unsigned (HotNews). US financing of roughly $7 billion was reportedly available through export-credit agencies, but conditional on a Romanian government guarantee that never came (Adevărul).

On 15 July, Nuclearelectrica shareholders will vote on whether the project's original strategy still holds. Conditions tied to a February 2026 investment decision were not met by their June deadline (BVB/SNN). The vote could lead to new contract terms, a different technology partner, or a redesigned project (Bursa). It is not a cancellation. But Europe's most advanced SMR deployment pausing to rethink its terms says a lot about the gap between nuclear ambition and nuclear bankability.

This is not NuScale's first stumble. Its previous flagship project in Idaho was cancelled after costs escalated and not enough utility buyers signed up (ANS). Regulatory approval proved the design was safe. It did not prove anyone could build it at a price customers would accept.

What it would cost on your electricity bill

An independent Romanian analysis estimated the construction-payback portion of Doicești's electricity price at roughly €244 per megawatt-hour, rising to around €276/MWh once operating costs are included (Romania Military). That figure is an outside estimate, not an official tariff. But for comparison, utility-scale solar and wind in Europe often come in far lower per unit of energy, though they cannot deliver the same steady output without batteries or backup (Lazard).

Romania's interim prime minister Ilie Bolojan has publicly questioned the spending already committed: roughly $240 million spent, with another $600 million potentially needed just for the pre-construction phase (Adevărul, ZF).

Every European SMR faces the same question

Romania is not alone. Across Europe, every country planning SMRs is designing some form of public financial cushion because no private investor will absorb the full risk of building a reactor type that has never operated commercially.

Poland's approach is the most explicit. Orlen Synthos Green Energy has applied for what it describes as the EU's first Contract for Difference for SMRs, covering 14 reactors (OSGE). A Contract for Difference is a public guarantee: if electricity market prices fall below an agreed floor, the government tops up the difference. It openly assumes that SMR power cannot compete on the open market yet. Sweden has gone further, with the state taking a 60% stake in its Videberg nuclear venture and instructing regulators to design long-term price-hedging tools compatible with EU rules (Swedish government). Czechia is tying its Rolls-Royce SMR plans to domestic industrial participation and state backing, though financial terms remain vague (World Nuclear News).

The pattern is consistent: no European country has found a way to finance first-of-a-kind SMRs on pure market terms.

Doicești's reassessment does not prove small reactors are doomed. It proves that the next test is whether governments can design contracts that make the first plant financeable without hiding the cost from the people who will pay the electricity bills for decades. The ferry-fleet logic may yet work. But the first ferry still needs a buyer.