Russia deploys 200 launchers in nuclear drill

Conventional deterrence fractures as the era of heavy armor meets the drone.
Image composition · tobriefFewer than 20 Ukrainian drone operators destroyed most of a NATO armoured column during a Swedish military exercise that ended May 13. Six days later, Russia began a nuclear forces drill far larger than its annual exercises. When conventional deterrence visibly breaks down, nuclear signaling lands harder.
What Twenty Drone Pilots Exposed
Aurora 26, an 18,000-strong exercise across Gotland and southern Sweden involving 13 allied nations, was designed to test defence against hybrid threats. Two small Ukrainian drone teams, invited as the adversary, turned it into a rout. They destroyed 28 of roughly 32 heavy armoured vehicles in one scenario and cleared an entire airfield in 20 minutes, forcing the exercise to pause three times so defenders could regroup.
Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson did not downplay the results. "It is completely right that they were demanding," he said, adding that "Ukraine is the best in the world at this." Supreme Commander Michael Claesson said all NATO allies must learn drone warfare "as quickly as possible".
Russia's Nuclear Drill, Without a Treaty
On May 19, Russia began a three-day nuclear exercise deploying all three legs of its nuclear triad (land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers) simultaneously, with over 200 missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 ships, and 13 submarines in play. Russia's annual "Grom" nuclear exercises typically involve a few thousand troops and a handful of test launches. This drill dwarfed them.
Belarus participated, explicitly practising "the delivery of nuclear munitions and their preparation for use". Russia has stationed its Oreshnik intermediate-range missile system on Belarusian soil, from where it can reach every European capital in under ten minutes. No European NATO member deploys anything comparable.
The drill is also the first major exercise since New START (the last US-Russia nuclear arms limitation treaty) expired on February 5. For the first time since 1972, no legally binding verification exists. NATO can no longer confirm Russian warhead counts through treaty inspections, relying instead on satellite imagery and signals intelligence.
Drones Already Crossing Borders
The conventional chaos from Ukraine's drone war is spilling into allied territory. On May 15, Finland shut Helsinki-Vantaa airport for three hours and told 1.7 million residents to stay indoors after intelligence warned Ukrainian drones heading toward Russia might stray into Finnish airspace. Nine flights were diverted. No drone arrived, but the lockdown showed how far the war's periphery now extends.
Four days later, a Romanian F-16 flying NATO Baltic Air Policing (the rotating fighter patrol that guards Baltic skies) shot down an unidentified drone over southern Estonia (Uudis.net, Polsatnews). It was the first such shootdown in the country's history. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur said it was likely a Ukrainian drone that veered off course. The incident happened during Estonia's Spring Storm exercise, which that same week had been practising drone response scenarios.
These drone incidents fed directly into the week's sharpest diplomatic split. Finland's President Alexander Stubb proposed coordinated European dialogue with Putin, conditional on mandates from European leaders and Ukraine. Lithuania's President Nausėda rejected the idea outright. The disagreement runs deeper than two presidents: Europe has no shared position on engaging Moscow while Russia's nuclear posture escalates and stray drones keep landing on allied soil.
The Ankara NATO summit in July will try to bridge these gaps. It arrives with NATO's conventional forces freshly exposed by cheap drones, Russia's nuclear reach demonstrated at scale, and the treaty architecture that once provided mutual transparency gone. Whether allies bring a drone doctrine, a nuclear posture review, or just more disagreement to Turkey will define the summer.
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- Model:
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