US bill targets ASML’s China service revenue

A proposed American law would extend US export controls over ASML, the Dutch company that builds the only machines capable of making the world's most advanced semiconductors. The fight is over who gets to decide what ASML sells, services and upgrades: the Dutch government, or the US Congress.

What ASML Makes, and Why China Wants It

ASML builds lithography machines, tools that use focused light to print microscopic circuit patterns onto silicon wafers. Its most advanced systems, called EUV (extreme ultraviolet), are unique. No other company makes them. Without EUV, you cannot produce the most powerful chips.

China has been ASML's fastest-growing market. Over the past three years, ASML earned roughly EUR 27 billion from Chinese customers, according to industry tracking, and the country still accounts for an estimated 19-20% of expected revenue even after earlier US-led restrictions (ad-hoc-news, Reuters). That revenue is what makes the coming legislation so consequential.

The MATCH Act, introduced in the US House and Senate in April 2026, would codify and broaden American semiconductor-equipment restrictions on China (ChinaTalk, Broadband Breakfast). It is not law yet. But Washington is already treating it as leverage.

On 19 June, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick raised a sharper concern directly with ASML: Washington believed one top EUV machine may have reached China. ASML denied it, pointing to a tracked global fleet of 314 operating EUV systems, none in China (Reuters, Boursorama). No enforcement finding supports the allegation.

The Service Lever Is the Real Weapon

Washington can reach a Dutch company because of something called the Foreign Direct Product Rule: if a foreign-made item was produced using specified American technology or equipment, the US can restrict its sale. Some US-origin components and intellectual property sit inside the global chip supply chain, giving this rule force beyond American borders (Handelsblatt, Techzine).

The MATCH Act would go further, targeting the servicing of machines already installed in Chinese factories. This is where the economics bite hardest. These machines need constant field engineering, spare parts, software updates and calibration to keep producing chips. If calibration slips, factories get fewer usable chips from each wafer, and output quality degrades fast. ASML's installed-base service revenue reached about EUR 8.2 billion in 2025, according to industry estimates (36Kr). A service ban would cut a recurring, high-margin income stream while slowly degrading Chinese chip production.

Who Loses in Europe

The cash flow ASML earns from China does not stay in the Netherlands. It funds the research network connecting ASML, Belgium's imec institute and major chipmakers (imec). Shrink that revenue and you shrink R&D spending precisely while the EU's European Chips Act is trying to build European semiconductor capacity (Akcie.cz).

Germany's car industry adds another dimension. Many automotive chips are made on older DUV (deep ultraviolet) machines, less advanced than EUV but potentially also covered by MATCH restrictions. If Chinese fabs lose access to DUV maintenance, it could tighten supply for the mature chips that go into cars, factory robots and industrial electronics. That does not automatically recreate the 2021-2023 shortages, but it raises the risk.

ASML's own CEO has warned that overly harsh embargoes may backfire, pushing China to accelerate its own lithography programme rather than freezing it out (BFM Business). France has framed the case most bluntly: Europe can own a strategic champion and still lack sovereignty if the rules governing it are written in Washington (FrenchWeb).

Dutch Trade Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma travelled to Washington on 23 June to lobby against the MATCH Act, even as the Netherlands simultaneously joined the US-led Pax Silica AI supply-chain initiative (Boursorama). That double move captures the bind. The Netherlands cannot walk away from the US security relationship. But it cannot hand Washington a veto over its most valuable company either. Owning ASML matters less if Europe cannot decide when ASML sells, services or upgrades its own machines.