Pentagon sets six-month clock for Europe forces

Six months. That is the timeline the Pentagon has set to decide which American military functions in Europe stay and which go. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told NATO ministers in June that some allies would fail the review while others would pass "with flying colors" (Stars and Stripes, Euronews). The stakes run deeper than troop counts. If Washington removes the command, intelligence, refuelling and nuclear functions that make NATO work before Europe builds replacements, deterrence weakens — without anyone formally breaking Article 5, NATO's mutual-defence clause.

What Washington Provides, What the Review Measures

Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top strategist, calls the shift "NATO 3.0": Europe takes over conventional defence, America keeps its nuclear umbrella and redirects forces toward the Pacific (Washington Times, RFI). In plain terms, Washington wants European governments to defend their own territory with their own command systems, on a timeline Europe did not choose.

The review goes beyond counting soldiers. It will assess whether allies grant fast base access and overflight rights during operations. A slow permission from one capital can make a NATO plan harder to execute in a crisis.

The functions Washington provides are what matter most. The US runs NATO's operating system: the command structure that coordinates forces across borders, the intelligence that spots threats, the tanker aircraft that keep jets in the air, the strategic airlift that moves heavy equipment, and the nuclear-sharing arrangements behind deterrence. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich commands both NATO's military operations in Europe and US European Command (Air & Space Forces Magazine). NATO planning still runs through American channels.

Allies Are Upgrading the Pipes, Not the System

Europe has started building physical infrastructure. NATO members approved a €27 billion fuel-supply plan pushing logistics capacity eastward (NATO). Poland is connecting radars and missile batteries into one air-defence network, so operators can track threats and launch interceptors from a single screen (Army Recognition). As To Brief reported, a German-led battle group recently stress-tested an overnight heavy-armour move through Poland into Lithuania, exposing friction in border permissions and road capacity. From Lithuania's Suwałki corridor (15min) to Greece's logistics bases (US Embassy Greece), similar upgrades are underway across the eastern flank.

None of this replaces the operating system. Europe's shared refuelling fleet will eventually reach about a dozen tanker aircraft. Grynkewich has said that is not enough to sustain a war (Air & Space Forces Magazine). The EU Institute for Security Studies describes European air-defence and surveillance capacity as thin, constrained by how fast interceptors can be produced and stockpiled (EUISS). Nuclear sharing is the hardest gap: France has opened dialogue about its deterrent's role in European security but offers no funded substitute for the US-linked architecture (IFRI). Germany bought F-35s for its nuclear-sharing mission, reinforcing rather than replacing dependence on American systems (Simple Flying).

The pattern holds across every flank state. Poland can host and move forces but cannot replace the command structure that coordinates them. Lithuania can receive a German brigade, but its deterrent value depends on air cover and reinforcement pipelines that do not yet work at scale. Romania can protect fixed installations like NATO's Aegis Ashore missile-defence site, but it cannot yet command a regional defence effort on its own.

The Clock Is Already Running

The Pentagon has already pulled 5,000 troops from Germany, including a long-range fires unit scheduled to deploy there, according to Stars and Stripes. Colby says the review will make NATO "stronger and more sustainable." The evidence from Europe's own defence institutions tells a different story: the continent can pour concrete and lay fuel lines faster than it can build the command, intelligence and nuclear architecture that runs through them.

The review's six-month clock runs against what European defence planners describe as a period of high near-term vulnerability. Europe is upgrading the plumbing. The operating system is still American. Colby and Hegseth owe an answer to the question their own review raises: what happens in the gap between the timeline Washington is setting and the timeline Europe can deliver?