Belgium Blocks Euroclear Asset Risk

Belgium's defence minister closed the door on 28 August on a renewed push to use frozen Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine. The reason was not a lack of sympathy for Kyiv. It was that no EU government has yet offered to carry the legal and financial risk now sitting in Brussels, because that is where most of the money is held.

Two days earlier, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain had written to Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign-policy chief, asking the European Commission, the bloc's executive arm, to examine ways of using immobilised Russian assets beyond taking the profits they generate (Government of the Netherlands, Reuters/WTVB). Theo Francken, Belgium's defence minister, replied that Prime Minister Bart De Wever would not shift (Nieuwsblad). To understand why, you have to start with Euroclear rather than with Ukraine.

Euroclear carries Europe's exposure

Euroclear is a Brussels-based company that holds and settles securities for banks and governments around the world. It is also where roughly €185–193 billion of the EU's approximately €210 billion in immobilised Russian central-bank assets now sit (Meduza, Commonspace). That concentration turns what sounds like a common European decision into a very specific Belgian exposure. If the EU moves from taking the proceeds to touching the assets themselves, Belgium and Euroclear will be first in line for Russian lawsuits and retaliation.

That is already happening. Le Monde has reported roughly 200 legal proceedings against Euroclear and nine arbitration notifications against Belgium (Le Monde). Ellipsis Avocats says a Moscow court has ordered Euroclear to pay nearly $250 billion. The ruling is not enforceable in the EU, but it shows the scale of escalation Moscow is prepared to attempt (Ellipsis Avocats).

For now, the EU has stayed on the safer side of the line. It takes the interest and investment proceeds generated by the frozen assets, rather than the assets themselves. That model is still producing money: another €1.4 billion was transferred to Ukraine on 5 August, bringing total proceeds to about €8 billion (European Commission). The four countries argue that the EU's €90 billion loan for 2026–2027, backed by the bloc's common budget, will not be enough. Their case is that a larger mechanism drawing on the frozen principal would give Ukraine funding it can rely on beyond the next tranche (Euractiv).

Everyone wants the money, nobody wants the bill

Belgium's position is conditional rather than absolute. Maxime Prévot, the foreign minister, said during an August visit to Kyiv that Belgium had no objection in principle to using the assets, provided the legal and financial risks were shared across all member states through binding guarantees (Kyiv Independent). The four-country letter accepts that logic, asking for options where "risk rests with all EU member states" (Government of the Netherlands). What it does not yet provide is the thing Belgium is asking for: unconditional, uncapped guarantees that would survive the first serious legal test (Euronews).

The difference between European solidarity and national liability becomes visible quickly. Poland's Radosław Sikorski said Warsaw was "ready to participate in insuring Belgium", but Polish reporting found no public legal formula for an uncapped indemnity (Radio ZET). Germany's Friedrich Merz has argued that risks should be divided according to economic size, though not as a blank cheque. German reporting estimated Berlin's share of such a guarantee could exceed €50 billion (Bundesregierung, FAZ). France and the Netherlands support the principle, but have not accepted unlimited liability (Ouest-France, Tweede Kamer).

Francken also aimed a pointed reminder at the Baltic states, telling them not to keep cornering Belgium while Belgium contributes to their security through NATO Baltic Air Policing, according to Nieuwsblad. The message was plain enough: solidarity cannot mean one country calls for boldness while another carries the consequences.

The question was expected to surface around the 1–2 September informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ireland. The Commission says it has "never taken the issue off the agenda" (Commission briefing). But the coalition in favour of using Russian assets is still wider than the coalition willing to underwrite Belgium's full liability. Until there is a legally binding, EU-wide guarantee covering Euroclear's exposure, Belgium's refusal is not obstruction. It is the price of hosting the infrastructure everyone else wants to use.