CETA courts face Dublin test

In October, the argument over CETA will move from EU trade policy into an Irish courtroom. Sinn Féin MEP Lynn Boylan is challenging the Government’s new law to ratify the EU-Canada trade agreement, saying it still falls short of what the Constitution allows (Irish Times). The case looks domestic, but the problem is European: the EU can negotiate and start applying a trade deal, yet a single member state’s constitutional rules can leave it legally unfinished for years.

Much of CETA is already in force. Since provisional application began in September 2017, nearly all tariffs between the EU and Canada have been removed (Council of the EU, Western People). European manufacturers and agri-food exporters face lower barriers and can compete for Canadian public contracts (Rijksoverheid). Germany’s ifo institute estimated a long-term gain of 0.19% in real per-capita income, meaning income per person after inflation, from the agreement (consulting.de). That is modest at economy-wide level, but the benefits have already landed in particular sectors. The unfinished part is the one that changes who can sue a state, and where.

The investor court nobody can agree on

CETA is a "mixed agreement". Some of it belongs to EU competence, while other parts touch powers that remain with national governments (Council of the EU). That means every member state must ratify it under its own constitutional rules before the whole treaty takes full legal effect. The disputed element is the Investment Court System, or ICS: a standing tribunal through which a foreign investor covered by CETA could sue a government for breaching investment commitments, outside the country’s ordinary courts (European Commission).

That is where the politics hardens. Opponents say foreign corporations would be given a special legal route not available to domestic businesses or citizens. In Ireland, that argument became a constitutional one.

In 2022, the Supreme Court ruled that Ireland could not ratify CETA as the law then stood, because the investor court system would leave Irish courts unable to review tribunal decisions (Comhlámh). By a 6-1 majority, the court also indicated that new legislation could solve the problem without a constitutional amendment (Irish Times).

The Government’s answer was the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2026. It makes compensation orders from investor tribunals enforceable in Ireland only with High Court permission, and allows the court to refuse enforcement where an order would conflict with Ireland’s constitutional order (William Fry). Boylan’s case argues that this still leaves Irish courts with too little control. The October hearing will test whether the Government has done enough.

The same fight across Europe

Ireland is not the only place where CETA has been held up. Belgium’s Wallonia region blocked the agreement in 2016; its regional parliaments only voted approval in June 2026 (PFWB). In France, the lower house approved ratification but the Senate rejected it (Vie publique). In the Netherlands, the bill had passed one chamber but was still before the Senate as of June 2026 (Eerste Kamer).

The resistance takes different forms, but the split is consistent. The tariff-cutting and market-opening parts of CETA have caused far less difficulty. The investor-rights provisions have not. French farming groups worry about price pressure from Canadian beef produced under different standards (Fondation Robert Schuman). German environmental organisations argue that the treaty court could be used to challenge environmental regulation (Umweltinstitut). These are feared outcomes rather than proven losses, but they have been politically strong enough to delay ratification.

The Dublin case will decide whether Ireland’s legislative fix meets the Supreme Court’s test. If it does not, the question for EU trade policy goes well beyond Canada. Can the EU keep putting investor courts into trade agreements if national constitutions keep pulling them back into ordinary democratic control?