Estonia Fires, Romania Holds Back

On May 19, NATO fighters shot down a drone over Estonia, the first interception in the country’s history (Polsat News). That same night, Russian drones hit the Ukrainian port of Izmail, just across the Danube from Romania. Bucharest sent up two F-16s, watched the attack on radar, and warned civilians (Hotnews). It did not shoot.

Five days earlier, Latvia’s government had fallen after drone crashes on its territory exposed serious gaps in air defence (Le Monde). The pattern is hard to miss: one alliance facing the same Russian tactic, but answering it in five different ways.

No Common Rules for Peacetime Skies

NATO does not have a single peacetime rulebook for shooting down drones. Its classified rules of engagement apply only to NATO-tasked forces and put de-escalation ahead of kinetic response. When a national army is operating over its own territory, it sits outside NATO command. That leaves each state to pass its own laws on when it can shoot.

Romania shows how that legal gap becomes a military hesitation. Bucharest passed shoot-down legislation in 2025 and, on May 15, authorised pilots to fire on Russian aircraft entering its airspace. Four days later, its F-16s took off and came back without firing. Since 2022, at least 66 Russian drones have crossed into Romanian airspace. None has been shot down.

At the B9 summit, the Bucharest Nine gathering of eastern NATO states coordinating security policy, allies asked Romania why. They got no answer.

NATO secretary general Mark Rutte put the cost problem plainly at the same summit: "We cannot continue taking out $20,000 costing drones with 3 or 4 million costing missiles". Operation Eastern Sentry, set up in September 2025 after drones entered Polish airspace, improves monitoring across the eastern flank. It does not give anyone authority to fire.

Five Countries, Five Calculations

In Slovakia, President Peter Pellegrini demanded urgent legislation to let the military intercept drones in peacetime, calling for a legal "threat state" between peace and war. Prime Minister Robert Fico refused to convene the security council, saying it was unnecessary. He had returned from Moscow two days before drones struck targets dozens of kilometres from Slovak villages.

Hungary turned drone defence into diplomatic leverage. The Magyar Péter government used attacks near Transcarpathia to press an 11-point minority rights demand on Ukraine, tying defence cooperation to Kyiv’s treatment of ethnic Hungarians, according to Euronews.

Bulgaria signed the B9 joint declaration but sent only its NATO ambassador, the lowest level of representation among the nine members. Days later, Sofia refused to back the Special Tribunal for Russian aggression against Ukraine, joining only Hungary, Slovakia and Malta in abstaining (BNR).

Poland is not waiting for a common NATO answer. Its Shield East fortification programme covers 260km of the eastern border with integrated counter-drone systems (Polish Ministry of Defence).

What the B9 Summit Didn't Produce

The summit’s joint statement described Russia as the "most significant, long-term and direct threat" and committed members to work towards defence spending of 5% of GDP by 2035 (NATO). It did not produce binding counter-drone targets. It did not produce common rules on when to engage.

That is the opening Russia is using. Latvia lost a government. Slovakia split at the top. Romania absorbed violations and held fire. Hungary bargained. Bulgaria kept its distance. Poland built its own defences. The drone campaign is testing more than airspace. It is testing whether NATO’s eastern flank can act as a single system before the next drone arrives.