Germany joins France’s nuclear drills

Two countries that could not settle who would sit in the cockpit of Europe’s next fighter jet are now trying to co-ordinate the military systems that sit around France’s nuclear deterrent. On July 17th, Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz announced a Franco-German Nuclear Steering Group, confidential talks on deterrence, and German conventional participation in a French nuclear exercise (Elysée, Al Jazeera). It has the sound of a grand European move. The reality is more limited, and that limit is where the politics sits.

What Germany Actually Gets

Germany is not getting French warheads. It is not getting custody, launch authority, or an automatic nuclear guarantee from Paris. France’s deterrent remains French. What Berlin gets is a place in the non-nuclear military architecture that protects and supports French nuclear operations: escort fighters, air defence, early warning, radar, and deep-strike co-ordination around temporary Rafale deployments (Telegraph, Boursorama/AFP). Merz has admitted that the exact shape of German participation still has to be worked out (Moneycontrol/AFP).

That distinction matters. Germany already takes part in NATO nuclear sharing, the American-led arrangement under which US nuclear weapons are based in Europe and allied aircraft train to deliver them, while Washington retains ultimate release control (Cambridge University Press). The French initiative adds another layer of planning and consultation. It does not replace the American one.

Patching Over Industrial Failure

The timing is doing plenty of work. FCAS/SCAF, the joint fighter programme meant to show that Europe could build a sixth-generation warplane together, has been thrown into serious doubt after Dassault and Airbus failed earlier this year to resolve their fight over leadership (DW). When Paris and Berlin cannot show industrial unity, they reach instead for strategic symbolism.

The nuclear steering group helps both leaders. It lets Macron reopen his long-running argument that France’s nuclear deterrent should be discussed with European allies, while keeping the keys firmly in Paris. It gives Merz a way to look active on European defence without stepping outside NATO. For Irish readers, from a state still protective of military neutrality, the distinction is familiar enough: European defence language often travels further than the actual transfer of power.

The Elysée did point to concrete work: conventional forces, precision strike and missile defence (Elysée). That gives the group something more useful to do than produce communiqués. The test is whether it leads to regular exercises and integrated planning, or whether it remains another carefully worded Franco-German declaration.

Eastern Europe Ranks, Not Rejects

The countries closest to Russia are not dismissing the French track. They are putting it in order.

Poland has opened its own nuclear co-operation steering group with France, and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has described a future in which the US acts as "cavalry over the hill" rather than permanent infantry on the ground (Bankier/PAP). Early discussions about permanent French weapons stocks in Poland point the same way: Warsaw sees French deterrence talks as useful insurance, not as a substitute for NATO (Rzeczpospolita).

Lithuania wants every available layer, but in a clear hierarchy: NATO and US guarantees first, air and missile defence second, and French dialogue only if it strengthens the chain from warning to decision to forces on the ground (tv3.lt, vz.lt). The pattern across Europe is consistent. No frontline government is rejecting French involvement, but none is treating it as a replacement for American power. For Poland and the Baltics, deterrence depends on who authorises action, which forces carry it out, and how quickly they arrive. A political declaration from Cologne does not answer those questions.

The Franco-German nuclear steering group is a political channel with some military work attached. It repairs the optics after FCAS stalled. It gives eastern-flank allies one more forum for consultation. But it does not create a European deterrence architecture, and no government outside Paris is pretending otherwise. The credibility test now sits with Merz and Macron: whether the exercise becomes routine, whether command relationships are clarified, and whether conventional forces actually deploy. Until then, France and Germany have written a promissory note on the letterhead of a partnership that has just failed to produce a fighter jet.