Greece holds up Russian LNG sanctions

Greece has held up the EU's 21st sanctions package against Russia over one line in the text: a ban on European companies helping to ship Russian liquefied natural gas to buyers outside the bloc. For more than a week, Athens has refused to give the consent that sanctions require, leaving the whole package stuck (Euronews, DH/Belga).

The delay is already costing something. An oil price cap that lapsed on 15 July was not renewed because it sat inside the same blocked package. That gives Moscow more room to sell crude at higher prices on shipments still covered by Western insurance (Eurasia Review, Euronews PL).

Why the clause threatens Greek shipping

The argument is not about Europeans buying Russian gas. It is about Europeans moving it. Until now, the EU has left largely untouched the ships, crews, insurers and service companies that help carry Russian LNG to Asia and other non-EU markets.

That matters because Russia cannot sell LNG at scale without the commercial machinery around transport: vessels, crewing, insurance, port transfers and contracts. The EU's sanctions strategy has leaned heavily on its ability to control those services. This clause would remove European operators from that chain.

Athens says the ban would not cut Russian revenue, but would merely shift the business to Chinese or other non-EU shipping companies while costing Europe maritime jobs and market share (Reuters). There is also a more specific interest at stake. Several European outlets have named Dynagas, the shipping company linked to magnate George Prokopiou, as a major beneficiary of Greece's objection (Politico, n-tv).

Dynagas is exposed in a very practical way. Its ice-class carriers are built for Arctic routes serving Russia's Yamal LNG terminal, and the company has shipped more than 10 million tonnes of Russian LNG since early 2025, according to Kpler data cited by the Financial Times (Rzeczpospolita, Berliner Zeitung).

That does not mean Dynagas wrote Greek policy. Greek officials have presented the objection as a defence of the country's shipping sector as a whole, and resistance from the wider industry is well documented (Cyprus Mail). But the mechanism is plain enough: a large maritime economy, with at least one highly exposed player, has used the EU's unanimity rule to seek a carve-out.

What Greece's veto costs

Sanctions need unanimity in the Council, where member-state governments make the decision. That gives every capital a blocking power (Council of the EU, Politico). Greece did not have to stage a dramatic veto. It only had to withhold agreement.

Because sanctions packages are bundles, the effect reaches beyond LNG. While the package remained frozen, the oil price cap drifted from about $44 towards $58 a barrel, increasing the legal revenue Moscow can earn through Western-insured shipments (Euronews PL). Each day of delay widens the difference.

The price of consent

The Irish Council presidency, which holds the rotating chair and brokers compromises between member states, tried to find a middle course. Its proposal would let European tankers keep carrying Russian LNG until January 2029, while capping volumes and banning new contracts. Greece rejected that and asked for an exemption with no end date.

Officials then examined weaker options: a 24-month delay, protection for existing contracts, or removing the LNG clause from the package altogether (Bloomberg).

Every version dilutes the original measure. Take the clause out, and the package passes without its strongest new tool. Give Greece a permanent exemption, and the ban becomes a legal gesture more than an economic constraint.

After three years of sanctions rounds, the pattern is familiar. National capitals put a price on their consent, and each concession makes the next exception easier to ask for. The EU built much of its Russia sanctions strategy around Western shipping and insurance services. Greece has shown the weakness in that design: the countries that host those services can demand protection before the sanction ever bites.