Greek Gas Exports Treble

Greece has spent years trying to turn its geography into energy leverage. In the first half of 2026, the numbers began to look less like ambition and more like a working business. Greek gas exports to Southeast Europe tripled to 8.72 TWh, from 2.86 TWh a year earlier, according to DESFA, the country's gas transmission operator (Reporter/DESFA).

There was a parallel electricity story in May, when Greece sent 874.2 GWh of net power into neighbouring grids, two-thirds of it towards Bulgaria (Serbia Energy). Those flows matter, but they are the easier part of the story. The harder question is whether companies are willing to pay, years in advance, for access to the gas routes now being sold as Southeast Europe's alternative supply spine.

How the gas moves

The machinery starts at the coast. Greece has two terminals taking in LNG, liquefied natural gas cooled for transport by tanker and then turned back into gas before it enters the grid. Revithoussa, near Athens, remains the main asset. It handled 18.61 TWh in the first half of 2026, covering 43% of Greek gas imports.

Alexandroupolis, a newer floating unit in the northeast, is still smaller but is growing quickly. It processed 3.46 TWh over the same period, more than three times the level recorded a year earlier (Reporter/DESFA).

Once the LNG has been regasified, it moves into DESFA's pipeline network and can cross into Bulgaria at Sidirokastro, the main border metering point. From there, operators can push it north through Romania towards Moldova and Ukraine. In Brussels and in regional energy circles, this is the Vertical Corridor: a south-to-north route meant to reduce dependence on older supply lines from the east.

Electricity is a more fragile export trade. Greece was cheap in May because renewables supplied 57% of generation and hydro added another 8%, pushing the day-ahead price, the wholesale price for next-day delivery, below neighbouring markets (Serbia Energy). A hot spell can change that quickly. Air-conditioning demand rises, gas-fired plants set the marginal price, and power flows can reverse within weeks. Gas pipeline bookings are harder to unwind. That is where the more serious test sits.

Who is booking capacity, and who isn't

The strongest commercial signal has come at Sidirokastro. In long-term auctions, 46% of available export capacity was booked for gas years 2026/27 through 2029/30. Metlen reserved 20 GWh/day and Atlantic SEE LNG Trade took 13 GWh/day (News247). That matters because capacity bookings cost money. They carry more weight than a ministerial statement about diversification.

The commitment is not uniform. In the same auctions, no bidder showed interest in Route 3 via Nea Mesimvria, a TAP-linked entry point (Protothema English). The map may show several corridors, but the market is already distinguishing between routes that look useful and routes traders are prepared to back with cash.

Further north, Moldova's state trader Energocom has booked winter 2026-2027 capacity at Ungheni, taking roughly 41% of Romanian exit capacity and 39% of Moldovan entry capacity at the border point (Moldova1). Romanian operators, meanwhile, are negotiating tariff changes for the corridor with Brussels (Știripesurse).

Hungary is still the missing link. Public Hungarian sources treat the Greek route as a technical possibility rather than an active supply channel. The debate there remains centred on MOL's Russian oil imports through the Druzhba pipeline and the Adriatic alternative (Telex/G7, HVG).

Who gains, who pays

The first winners are in Greece. Terminal operators get more throughput. Traders get more optionality. Power producers benefit when regional conditions make Greek generation competitive. DESFA collects transmission fees on every cubic metre crossing its network.

Neighbouring governments also gain something harder to price: leverage. A credible Greek route gives Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova more room in negotiations with existing suppliers. Croatia is not necessarily losing from this shift either. Its expanded Krk LNG terminal, moving towards 6.1 bcm/year capacity, belongs to the same diversification story rather than standing outside it (Poslovni).

The bill lands with buyers. Extra routes improve security, but gas moving from south to north gathers costs at each stage: regasification fees, transmission tariffs, transit charges and the balancing costs paid by networks to keep supply and demand aligned. If the Greek route is more secure but more expensive once all those charges are included, households and factories in Bulgaria, Romania or Moldova are paying a premium for diversification.

Whether that premium is worth paying depends on the alternatives. Russian gas has not disappeared from the European system. EU imports of Russian pipeline gas rose 7% year on year in the first five months of 2026, while Russian LNG rose 11%, according to ACER data (Euro2day, ACER).

Greece has shown the route can work. It has not yet shown that the route gives it supplier power. That will require sustained flows at prices that still beat the alternatives after every border fee has been counted. The real test is only beginning.