Hegseth reviews US assets in Europe

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered a six-month review of every American military asset in Europe, dressing the exercise up as "NATO 3.0": Europeans defend Europe, and Washington moves back a step. The legal lever is simple enough. This is a unilateral American process, resting on the president's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. No European capital, and no NATO body, has a veto (CBS, Le Monde).

Europe is being told to prepare for a bill it cannot refuse.

What Washington Actually Provides

The list reportedly under review is not marginal. It includes 50 of 150 fighter jets, all eight aerial refuelling tankers, 11 of 26 maritime patrol aircraft, a missile submarine, a carrier strike group and one of two bomber groups (Tagesspiegel).

Those are the systems that turn NATO's defence plans from paper into something usable: air cover, surveillance, long-range strike, maritime monitoring, and the ability to move serious force across the Atlantic when it matters (Al Jazeera). Take away the tankers, and European jets cannot stay in the air long enough. Take away patrol aircraft, and submarine tracking develops gaps. This is not about trimming the visible bulk of NATO. It is about the wiring behind the wall.

Mark Rutte, NATO's secretary-general, tried to steady the room. He said the review would happen "in close consultation with allies" and that NATO's Supreme Allied Commander believes many withdrawn capabilities are either already covered or soon will be (NATO). Germany's defence minister, Boris Pistorius, was less soothing. Rapid reductions without a clear European replacement plan, he warned, would create "dangerous capability imbalances" (Der Spiegel, Adevărul).

That gap between reassurance and warning is where Europe now sits.

Spending Up, Dependence Intact

Washington's complaint about burden-sharing is not invented. European allies increased core defence spending by more than $90 billion in 2025, almost 20% in a single year (NATO). Poland now leads NATO in defence spending as a share of national output. Romania has set aside €16.68 billion from SAFE, the EU's new Security Action for Europe loan instrument for military procurement, for combat vehicles, anti-drone systems and ammunition (Mediafax).

But spending money is not the same as replacing capability. Between 2020 and 2024, 64% of arms imports by European NATO states came from the United States (Le Nouvel Économiste). Europe still lacks the factories, components, powder and skilled labour to scale its own defence industry quickly.

The politics are no tidier. France, Germany and Italy risk ending up with three separate combat-aircraft programmes instead of one after the flagship SCAF project stalled over governance and technology-sharing disputes (Le Monde). Larger budgets routed through American suppliers deepen the dependence they are supposed to cure.

For Irish readers, this is where the European defence argument becomes familiar and awkward at the same time. Neutrality does not remove Ireland from the security system around it. It does mean that any move towards a more self-reliant European defence posture lands here as both a practical question and a political one.

The Eastern Flank Reads It First

Poland has read Hegseth's pressure campaign as an opening. Warsaw is now lobbying for a permanent American base on Polish soil, with defence minister Kosiniak-Kamysz claiming an early positive response from the Pentagon (Polsat News). Even NATO's biggest spender by share of national output still wants America physically embedded in its defence.

Lithuania sees the danger more sharply. Experts there described a rapid US pullback as a "gift to Russia", warning that the transition period would itself create vulnerability (LRT). Baltic defence planners know the list of things they cannot quickly replace: long-range air defence, electronic warfare, early warning, and the logistics chains that move allied reinforcements into position.

Romania frames the same problem through the Black Sea. The bases at Deveselu and Mihail Kogălniceanu are anchors of allied deterrence, and Romanian coverage has focused on the assets Washington may no longer automatically provide: tankers, ISR drones, fighters and maritime patrol aircraft (Euronews Romania).

No one outside the Pentagon has seen the actual cut list. Congress requires reporting before troop levels fall below 76,000, and defence-spending bills in both the House and Senate are trying to restrict major reductions (NOTUS). But the review is about capabilities, not just headcounts.

Until NATO can publish a capability-by-capability replacement map, showing who fills each gap, when, and with what, its reassurances rest on a transition timetable Washington may simply choose not to honour.