Lithuania Blocks Belarus Potash Transit

The United States asked Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine to reopen the route for Belarusian potash exports. All three refused. The request arrived in May 2026 as an unsigned State Department "nonpaper", the sort of informal policy note that lets governments test an idea without owning it publicly.

Washington had already lifted its own restrictions on Belaruskali, the Belarusian state potash monopoly. The EU has not. That distinction matters because sanctions in Europe are not switched on and off by national capitals. They sit in EU law, and changing them takes all 27 member states.

Why No Single Country Can Say Yes

The potash restrictions are written into Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, a law that applies directly to customs authorities, railway operators and port terminals across the EU (finance.ec.europa.eu). It does not only ban imports. It also bans the transit and transport of Belarusian potassium chloride through EU territory (gov.ie).

Lithuania's foreign minister, Kęstutis Budrys, described the position bluntly: while EU sanctions remain in force, "such activities cannot be carried out in Lithuania, Latvia or Poland" (LRT).

For smaller EU states, this is the point of the system. A rule agreed unanimously becomes a shield against pressure from larger powers. The sanctions were adopted by unanimity in the Council of the EU, where every member state must agree. Removing them requires the same procedure. The EU unanimously renewed its Belarus sanctions in February 2026 until February 2027, keeping the potash restrictions in place (Mayer Brown).

The American request therefore asked three countries to do something they cannot legally do on their own. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda put it plainly: "We could not change anything even if we wanted to."

Prisoners for Potash

Washington's case is built on a transaction. Since January 2025, Trump envoy John Coale has travelled repeatedly to Minsk, securing the release of more than 500 political prisoners, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova, in return for staged US sanctions relief (Euronews, RFE/RL). By March 2026, Washington had fully removed Belaruskali from its sanctions list.

The nonpaper then added a second argument: European transit revenues could help fund Ukraine's defence. It was a careful framing, designed to make refusal look like a failure of solidarity rather than a defence of the sanctions regime.

The larger strategic claim is that easing pressure on Minsk might loosen Belarus's dependence on Moscow. That runs into the military reality on the ground. Russia deployed its nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile system to Belarus in December 2025, the same week as the potash deal (Arms Control Association). Ukraine's foreign minister, Andriy Sybiha, rejected the premise: "There should be no illusions that someone, through some kind of concessions, will be able to pull Belarus out of Russia's sphere of influence" (Interfax Ukraine).

The Price of Saying No

Lithuania is paying for its position. Belarusian potash once accounted for nearly a third of cargo at Klaipėda port. Losing it cost about €14 million annually in port revenue. The terminal that handled the shipments saw income fall from €96 million to €3.2 million (Lrytas).

Poland has been quieter. Warsaw has neither confirmed nor denied receiving the nonpaper. Its rail gauge incompatibility with Belarus gives it a useful technical obstacle alongside the legal one (Rzeczpospolita).

The EU, meanwhile, has moved in the opposite direction to Washington. Its 20th sanctions package, adopted in April 2026, added new designations against Belarusian entities and raised tariffs on Belarusian potash reaching the bloc (Mayer Brown).

Ukrainian presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn identified the wider danger: "It gives Putin confidence that sanctions can be eased" (RBC-Ukraine). If a major EU sectoral sanction can be picked apart through bilateral US pressure on individual capitals, the same approach could be tried on Russian energy and finance restrictions.

The next real test comes in February 2027, when the Belarus sanctions come up for their annual unanimous renewal. Any single member state can block an extension. Hungary has used that leverage before on Russia packages, though under its new government led by Péter Magyar, Budapest has moved closer to the EU mainstream.

There is another piece moving in the background. Lukashenko has floated a $3 billion mine sale to US investors (Euromaidan Press). If American companies buy into Belarusian potash production, Washington's quiet request would no longer be only about diplomacy. It would come with direct commercial interest attached.