Magyar drops vetoes for €17 billion

Péter Magyar’s first foreign trip as Hungary’s prime minister was chosen with care. He went to Poland: Kraków, Warsaw, Gdańsk, and a meeting with Lech Wałęsa. The message was plain enough. The man who defeated Viktor Orbán in April’s landslide wants to place himself in Central Europe’s democratic-recovery story, with Donald Tusk as the obvious guide.

The turn in Budapest is real, but it is narrower than it first looks. Magyar has already released several EU decisions Orbán kept tied up for years. He has not dismantled much of the politics Orbán built.

The Transactional Reset

The institutional change came quickly. Within days of taking office, Hungary dropped its veto on the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine and allowed the 20th sanctions package against Russia to pass. Foreign Minister Anita Orbán said Budapest would stop using vetoes “as political theatre” (Kyiv Independent, Euronews). Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary had blocked, or effectively blocked, 21 European Council decisions. That habit has now been formally dropped.

The reward is roughly €17 billion in frozen EU funds. The most urgent part is €10.4 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the EU’s post-pandemic investment programme. Hungary must claim it by 31 August or lose it for good.

Magyar flew to Brussels on 29 April and wants to sign a deal with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen by late May. The Commission is showing unusual flexibility, with officials telling Hungarian media there is “a real chance” of drawing down the full amount (Telex).

Same Policies, Different Manners

The substance is a good deal more familiar. Magyar told the Financial Times his government “would not change Hungary’s position on military support for Ukraine” and would not suddenly cut ties with Russia (Magyar Tisza). Hungary still sends no weapons to Kyiv. Magyar says Russian energy will be phased out by 2035, a timetable that keeps Moscow as a supplier through this decade.

On migration, he rejects the EU’s mandatory solidarity mechanism, the rule requiring countries either to take asylum seekers or pay into the system. That is Orbán’s position, almost word for word.

Czech analysts have put their finger on the puzzle: Magyar represents “a change in tone, not necessarily in substance” (Seznam Zprávy). He has given up the instruments Orbán used for leverage. He has not reversed the policies Orbán embedded.

Fico Without a Partner

The clearest loser is Robert Fico. Slovakia’s prime minister depended on Hungary as a structural partner in blocking EU decisions on sanctions and Ukraine. That partnership is effectively over.

Fico, who visited Putin in Moscow on 9 May as the only sitting EU leader to do so, is now far more exposed. Under EU majority voting rules, Slovakia’s 5.5 million people cannot block decisions by themselves (Centre for European Reform).

On files that still require unanimity, including foreign policy and sanctions, Fico keeps a formal veto. But pressure is building elsewhere. In April, the European Parliament voted to ask the Commission to activate its tool for freezing funds over democratic backsliding against Bratislava (EU Observer).

With roughly 20% of Slovak GDP tied to EU budget transfers, confrontation now carries a heavier price. Fico’s response has been pragmatic: once the Druzhba oil pipeline resumed, Slovakia quietly dropped its block on the 20th sanctions package. That looked less like ideological defiance than a calculation of costs.

The Pattern Brussels Should Watch

Magyar and Tusk want to revive the Visegrád Group, the informal alliance of Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia. A Median poll for Czech public radio found 80% of Czech citizens support renewed cooperation. But the format only works when all four members share a basic direction. Fico’s Moscow visit sits awkwardly beside Magyar’s Polish pilgrimage.

The deeper question is whether Brussels has learned from Poland. When Tusk took office in 2023, the Commission moved quickly to unfreeze funds before reforms had been verified. Analysts at CEPS warn that the same pattern may now be appearing in Hungary: “political alignment, not verified compliance” driving the decision (CEPS).

Magyar still has not signed the Special Tribunal for Russian aggression. Ukraine’s EU accession remains blocked pending a Magyar-Zelenskyy meeting. The 27 reform milestones attached to the frozen funds are largely unmet.

Magyar has changed who Hungary works with. What Hungary actually does still looks strikingly familiar. And €10.4 billion depends on a deadline now ten weeks away.