Magyar frees €6.6 billion in EU arms funds

Three weeks into office, Péter Magyar moved a file Viktor Orbán had kept jammed for two years. On 1 June, Hungary's ambassador to the EU's Political and Security Committee, the Brussels body that oversees EU defence policy, indicated that Budapest would stop vetoing the European Peace Facility, the off-budget fund used to reimburse member states for about 40% of the weapons they donate to Ukraine from national stockpiles (Euromaidanpress, NewsUkraine). The money released immediately was €6.6 billion, frozen since 2024.

Magyar was careful about the politics of it. Speaking in Berlin that same day, he said: "Hungary will send neither soldiers nor weapons to Ukraine" (Tagesschau). The point is that the EPF does not ask Hungary to do that. It pays back other countries, including Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden, for weapons they have already sent. Orbán's veto did not stop the weapons reaching Ukraine. It stopped the refund to the allies that supplied them.

The 72-Hour Deal That Nobody Called a Deal

Two days before the EPF move, the European Commission agreed to release €16.4 billion in cohesion and recovery funds that had been frozen under Orbán over rule-of-law concerns (Euronews, Ara.cat). Cohesion money is the EU's long-running tool for narrowing economic gaps between regions, paying for infrastructure and development. Recovery funds are the post-pandemic programme Brussels tied more tightly to governance standards.

On 3 June, Magyar then announced an agreement with Ukraine on minority rights for roughly 100,000 ethnic Hungarians in Zakarpattia. The package covered language protections, Hungarian-language schooling and administrative rights in communities where Hungarians make up more than 10% of the population (HVG).

No official described this as a package deal. They rarely do. But over 72 hours, the pieces landed in sequence: Hungary stopped blocking the EPF, the Commission released Hungary's money, and Ukraine offered concessions on Hungarian minority rights. Berlin gave its blessing at once, with Chancellor Merz calling Magyar "an inspiration for all of Europe" (Tagesspiegel).

Magyar sold the outcome at home as proof of competence: "In three weeks we achieved what Orbán couldn't in ten years." Fidesz attacked from the other side, alleging hidden conditions and a "war tax" on Hungary (Origo). Both versions glide past the central mechanism. Lifting the EPF veto cost Hungary nothing directly, because the fund reimburses other countries, not Budapest.

A Fund That Can't Cover Its Promises

The relief in Brussels is real, but it is not as large as the headline suggests. EU member states have submitted reimbursement claims worth €43 billion for weapons donated to Ukraine (Eurointegration). Since the EPF covers roughly 40%, about €26 billion remains uncovered. The fund's original envelope is almost spent (Kyiv Independent).

Slovakia's defence minister, Robert Kaliňák, put a practical number on the shortfall. Bratislava expected €250 million for donating MiG-29 fighters and S-300 air defence systems. It will receive roughly a tenth of that (Topky.sk). Sweden, which has committed 21 support packages worth about 103 billion kronor, expects at least 60 billion kronor back but has been given no timetable (Göteborgs-Posten).

The Veto Stays Loaded

The deeper problem has not been fixed. Every EPF disbursement still requires unanimity among all 27 member states, because EU foreign and security policy remains built around national vetoes. That is how a single government froze billions for two years. Another government could do the same tomorrow.

Slovakia showed the method in 2025, vetoing the 18th sanctions package six times before securing energy guarantees from the Commission (Euronews). The leverage lies not in having the biggest army or the deepest treasury, but in holding a procedural key everyone else needs.

The EU has found ways around unanimity in newer instruments, including the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan, where dissenting countries were simply left out. The EPF is different. It is the mechanism that pays governments back for weapons already sent, and it still runs on unanimity. The weakness is part of the design.

Orbán's government has also brought a case before the EU's General Court challenging the legal workaround Brussels used to channel profits from frozen Russian assets through the EPF without Hungary's consent. Magyar has not said whether he will withdraw it. No journalist has pressed him on that point. If the court finds for Budapest, billions in payments already made could be thrown into legal doubt.