Magyar’s 141-seat supermajority targets Orbán’s system

Péter Magyar arrived in office carrying the instrument Viktor Orbán spent 16 years building: a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority. Tisza won 141 of 199 seats on 53% of the vote, using an electoral system Orbán designed to keep Fidesz in power (Verfassungsblog). The machine now belongs to someone else.

That majority lets Magyar rewrite Hungary’s constitution, reverse judicial appointments and unwind structures that moved public assets towards Orbán’s allies. The legal power is there. The harder question is whether the evidence survives long enough, and whether EU money can be released before the reform clock runs out.

Shredders, USB Drives, and Lawyers in the Ministries

Magyar’s staff found 15 to 20 bags of shredded documents in the basement of the former Construction Ministry, stored beside Fidesz campaign material in a government building (Spiegel). He filed a criminal complaint and opened an anonymous whistleblower platform. Civil servants from several ministries have approached Tisza with files on USB drives, reportedly in exchange for keeping their jobs (Forbes Hungary).

Hungarian media reports say Magyar has put lawyers in charge of key ministries, with deadlines to audit and cancel Orbán-era contracts. That includes deals that channelled state wealth into politically connected foundations.

Hungary has also said it will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, or EPPO, the EU body that investigates fraud involving EU money. Orbán refused to join it. Incoming European Chief Prosecutor Andrés Ritter urged speed: "What you don't secure quickly, both evidence and criminally obtained assets, you'll hardly get later" (Sonntagsblatt). If Hungary gives EPPO jurisdiction back to its 2021 founding, Orbán-era subsidy fraud can be pursued at European level.

Three Months to Unlock €10.4 Billion

The European Commission froze about €19 billion in Hungarian EU funds under Orbán, citing rule-of-law breaches. Of that, €10.4 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the EU’s post-pandemic investment fund, faces a hard deadline: all reform milestones must be met by August 31, 2026 (XpatLoop). Magyar has three months to satisfy 27 "super-milestones" covering judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement and procurement transparency. He wants a political deal with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen by late May (Euronews).

The Commission and member states now face a familiar EU dilemma: reward the political break with Orbán, or hold the money until the legal changes are proven. Six countries, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia, want strict proof before funds move. They have reason to be wary. When Donald Tusk took power in Poland in 2023, the Commission released money before judicial reforms had actually been completed (Do Rzeczy).

EPP leader Manfred Weber has already called for Hungary’s Article 7 procedure, the EU’s strongest sanction for democratic backsliding, to be dropped on the basis of Magyar’s election alone, before reforms are delivered (European Conservative). If the EU releases funds because the voters changed the government rather than because institutions have changed, it weakens its leverage in the next rule-of-law fight.

The Resistance Inside the System

Hungary’s institutions have not all accepted the new order. President Tamás Sulyok, an Orbán appointee whose term runs until 2029, rejected Magyar’s May 31 resignation ultimatum, saying there is no constitutional basis for removing him. His office is mostly ceremonial, but he can send legislation to the Constitutional Court, where Fidesz-appointed judges still have a majority (ICONnect). Removing him requires the two-thirds vote Magyar controls, followed by a ruling from that same court. That gives Orbán’s network a way to delay, though not necessarily to block.

Magyar’s first foreign visits, to Warsaw and Vienna, were meant to show that Hungary wants back into the European fold after years of Orbán’s pro-Kremlin isolation. In Poland, he and Donald Tusk discussed LNG access and pipeline interconnectors to reduce dependence on Russian gas (Rzeczpospolita).

Yet Tisza is built around Magyar in much the same way Fidesz was built around Orbán. His government has kept Orbán’s positions on arms to Ukraine and EU joint borrowing. Polish analysts call him a "Hungarian Tusk", but the comparison is not simple praise: Tusk has faced criticism in Poland for using his mandate selectively. Magyar now governs with a party centred on his personality, a constitution he can rewrite, and the same supermajority that made Orbán untouchable for 16 years. The tools for repairing institutions and capturing them are the same tools.