Pentagon cuts Europe combat brigades

The Pentagon last week reduced US combat brigades in Europe from four to three, bringing American ground forces back to the level that existed before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Stars and Stripes, Washington Examiner). Within hours, Donald Trump said on Truth Social that he would send "5,000 additional troops to Poland". No deployment plan followed. The Pentagon sent reporters to the White House; the White House pointed them back to the post (Stars and Stripes). Poland's foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, read it more carefully: the promise meant "maintaining the presence of American troops more or less at the current level" (Notes from Poland).

That gap between the announcement and the numbers hung over NATO foreign ministers in Helsingborg, Sweden, as they prepared for July's summit in Ankara.

The Withdrawal Sequence

On May 1, Trump ordered 5,000 troops out of Germany. On May 13, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth cancelled a 4,000-troop armoured brigade rotation to Poland, even though equipment was already moving and advance units were on the ground (Breaking Defense, Politico). Army leaders told Congress they had learned of the cancellation only days beforehand.

Then came reports that Trump had phoned Hegseth demanding an explanation, annoyed that Poland had been hit rather than a less cooperative ally. The "5,000 to Poland" post followed. The most direct way to make the promise real would be to restore the rotation that had just been scrapped.

Across Europe, the likely net effect is still a drop of about 5,000 US rotational troops. Nato's top military commander, SACEUR Alexus Grynkewich, confirmed that figure on May 19 and told allies to "absolutely expect additional redeployments" (NATO). The Pentagon has also quietly reduced what it offers to the NATO Force Model, the classified system under which members pledge forces that can be activated in wartime. Because that move avoids the formal troop caps set by US law, Congress cannot block it (Military Times).

Germany Takes the Hit

There is a pattern in the reshuffle. Allies that worked with Washington's military operations against Iran kept their forces. Those that pushed back lost them. Germany, whose chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly criticised Trump's Iran strategy, lost both soldiers and a planned deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles. Poland, whose president Karol Nawrocki has a personal channel to Trump, got its reward on social media (Der Spiegel).

Berlin took the embarrassment quietly. Foreign minister Johann Wadephul described the withdrawal as a routine, "expected rotation" (Deutschlandfunk). Merz, who had pressed publicly to buy 400 US-made Tomahawk missiles, stopped raising the issue after Washington went silent on the request. Germany is now looking at a joint venture to produce cruise missiles at home (ZDF).

Estonia's foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, put the wider allied complaint plainly in Helsingborg: "Everything that concerns NATO deterrence and capabilities must happen in coordinated ways" (Estonian MFA). The objection was not to Europe doing more. It was to Washington making decisions without consulting the countries left to manage the consequences.

Hormuz, Frigates, and the Race to Build

US secretary of state Marco Rubio added another pressure point in Helsingborg, telling allies to prepare a "Plan B" for the Strait of Hormuz if Iran refuses to reopen the waterway. He cast it as a test of NATO's value to Washington (NATO). France rejected the framing. "The North Atlantic Treaty applies to the North Atlantic," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. "It is neither its purpose, nor the appropriate alliance for a subject in the Middle East" (Iran International).

Europe's answer is moving from complaint to procurement. Sweden has signed a deal for four frigates from France's Naval Group, its largest military acquisition since the 1980s (Le Monde, Euronews). France has extended its nuclear deterrent umbrella to eight partner countries, with bilateral steering groups already operating with Germany, Sweden, and Denmark (L'Éventail). The withdrawals were meant to force allied compliance. Instead, they are speeding up the European defence buildout that could, over time, make American leverage less decisive.