Rome swaps defence loans for energy leeway

Italy’s new fiscal room comes at the direct expense of its military modernization.
Cumadóireacht íomhá · tobriefGiorgia Meloni's government sold it as a win. On June 3, the European Commission announced that EU countries could keep certain energy spending outside their normal budget calculations: up to 0.3% of GDP per year, with a cumulative cap of 0.6% through 2028. For Italy, that means roughly €14 billion in room to manoeuvre. Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti said he was "satisfied", describing the move as "unthinkable a few months ago." Then came the more telling line: "It's a long and complicated path. Let's see how it ends."
That caution was well placed. Three limits make the headline number far less generous than it first appears.
Borrowed from the Barracks
The energy clause does not give Italy a fresh pot of money. It fits inside the existing 1.5%-of-GDP National Escape Clause, the EU mechanism that allows governments, temporarily and under conditions, to spend beyond their usual budget limits. The EU first activated it for defence after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Commission has now widened what counts as eligible spending within the same ceiling, using an administrative communication rather than new law.
That matters because every euro Rome books for energy under the clause is a euro it cannot book for defence. The Italian government made that choice. It had planned to borrow roughly €14.9 billion through SAFE, the EU programme offering 45-year defence loans on favourable terms, before cutting the request to about €5 billion (Il Foglio, Euronews). In effect, that gives up roughly €10 billion in military investment. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto put it plainly: "Politically, I know my request isn't popular, but I'm doing this for the country."
Turning down SAFE does not save Italy money in any simple sense. It means passing over cheap financing for tanks, satellites and fighter jets at a time when Europe's security environment is under severe pressure.
Green Investments, Not Fuel Discounts
The second limit is what the spending can actually cover. The Commission has ruled out fossil fuel subsidies, including the fuel tax cuts Italy has repeatedly renewed at significant cost. The eligible spending is green investment: renewables, grids, battery storage, heat pumps and electric vehicles.
Meloni framed the push as help with high energy bills. The Commission's response was sharper than the usual Brussels prose: "You cannot solve a supply shock by stimulating demand." Angelo Bonelli of Italy's Greens spelled out the political consequence: "Brussels excluded the use of European flexibility to finance discounts at the pump."
So the Italian shorthand of "€14 billion for energy costs" is doing a lot of work. The money is for the energy transition. It is not for cheaper petrol.
Who Can Actually Spend It
The clause is available to all 27 EU member states if they ask for it. In practice, access depends on the condition of each country's public finances. Ten countries are in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the EU process for states running deficits above 3% of GDP. Any extra spending they claim must still fit inside binding paths to bring those deficits down.
France is the useful example. Paris is in the procedure and is trying to get its deficit under control by the end of the decade. The French finance ministry has said nothing about the energy clause. That silence says more than Rome's celebration. For a government already under orders to cut borrowing, flexibility can exist on paper without being spendable in practice.
The Commission's method is familiar to anyone who has watched eurozone fiscal politics for long enough: give national governments a political headline, while keeping the underlying discipline in place. High-debt countries were meant to be the obvious beneficiaries, yet they have been the most reluctant to activate even the original defence clause. Italy got its recognition. Brussels kept the rules.
EU finance ministers meet as Ecofin on June 11. The European Council follows on June 18-19. Both still have to approve the move. If the ceiling can be stretched for each crisis as it arrives, the harder question is what that ceiling is meant to enforce.
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