Rosatom Keeps Its EU Foothold

A fuel plant in Lower Saxony has shown up the awkward truth in Europe’s sanctions policy. Germany has spent three years trying to unwind its energy relationship with Russia, yet last month a German authority approved the manufacture of reactor components using Russian state nuclear technology. Berlin says it opposes the arrangement. It also says it has no legal way to stop it.

That is the gap Rosatom still occupies. The EU has cut Russian coal, most oil and much of its gas out of the European market. Civil nuclear trade has largely been left alone.

On 22 July, Lower Saxony approved an expansion at the fuel-element plant in Lingen, operated by a subsidiary of France's Framatome. The new line will allow the plant to make fuel assemblies for VVER reactors, a Soviet-era design still used across Central and Eastern Europe (Framatome, BMUKN). The work depends on licences, technology and machinery from TVEL, the fuel arm of Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom.

Why Berlin Approved What It Opposes

Germany's federal environment ministry said the law gave it no basis to refuse. German atomic law is built around safety, not foreign policy, and EU sanctions do not currently cover civil nuclear cooperation (BMUKN). Lower Saxony's environment minister Christian Meyer said Russian involvement was wrong, but the state was acting under federal supervision and could not deny the licence (NDR).

The approval was not unconditional. It came with restrictions on Rosatom personnel access, separation of IT systems and checks on hardware (ZEIT). Germany is containing the Russian role rather than removing it.

The reason the EU has not closed the opening is partly technical and partly political.

Nuclear fuel cannot be switched like crude oil. A fuel assembly is a precision component made for a particular reactor, licensed by a national regulator and loaded according to a set operating cycle. Framatome counts 19 VVER reactors still operating in the EU (Framatome). Replacing Russian-origin fuel means new designs, trial assemblies and approvals reactor by reactor. That takes years.

The political obstacle is more familiar. EU sanctions require unanimity under Article 31 of the EU Treaty (EUR-Lex). A single government can stop the package. Hungary's foreign minister Péter Szijjártó has said nuclear sanctions would threaten Budapest's Paks II expansion, a Rosatom-led project backed by a Russian state loan of up to €10 billion (Agenzia Nova, World Nuclear Association).

Where the Real Dependency Sits

Russia's strongest grip is not on raw uranium but on the industrial steps that turn it into usable reactor fuel. According to the Euratom Supply Agency, Russia supplied about 15.6% of the EU's natural uranium in 2024, but around 22.4% of conversion services, which turn uranium ore into gas suitable for enrichment, and 23.5% of enrichment services, which raise the concentration of fissile material so it can power a reactor (Euratom Supply Agency, S&P Global). These middle stages are harder to replace because only a small number of plants worldwide can do them at scale.

The VVER countries are moving at different speeds. Czechia and Bulgaria are already shifting away: Temelin received its last TVEL delivery at the end of 2024, and Kozloduy's Unit 5 is loading Westinghouse fuel (Seznam Zprávy, Sega). Slovakia has Western fuel contracts signed, but they are not yet fully in place across all five reactors. Nuclear provides about 62% of its electricity, leaving little margin for mistakes (Reuters, World Nuclear Association). Hungary has not yet licensed Western fuel for Paks; Framatome's first alternative assemblies are expected around 2028 (Atlatszo).

France complicates the picture from the supplier side. Reuters reported that France imported 39% of its enriched uranium from Russia in 2025 (Reuters). Orano, the French fuel-cycle company, wants declining quotas rather than a sudden cut, while Framatome could win VVER fuel contracts from the Lingen expansion. Paris can argue for diversification while still benefiting from the current arrangement.

The Economic Case for Deadlines

The United States has already chosen a middle course. Washington banned Russian uranium imports in 2024, but allowed temporary waivers where alternatives are not yet available (Congress). The EU has not put forward an equivalent proposal, despite its REPowerEU pledge to end dependence on Russian energy (European Commission).

A European timetable would create winners and losers. Westinghouse, Framatome and Urenco-linked enrichment capacity in Europe would gain contracts and a clearer case for investment. The current uncertainty is already holding back spending decisions at Urenco (Reuters). Rosatom would lose revenue. Budapest would lose leverage.

An immediate blanket ban would be careless, because some reactors cannot yet run on non-Russian fuel. Leaving things as they are keeps Rosatom embedded in European energy infrastructure well into the next decade. The practical answer is a binding phase-out, timed to when each reactor can switch, with waivers for genuine bottlenecks. Without that, Europe will keep sanctioning Russian energy with one hand while licensing Russian nuclear cooperation with the other.