Russia Targets Ukraine’s Substations

Russia’s defence ministry said on 30 August that it was preparing "massive strikes" on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, presenting the move as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries (Euronews, The Irish Times). Moscow did not say when the strikes would come, what would be hit, or what weapons would be used. The threat is being taken seriously because Russia has already spent two winters learning which parts of Ukraine’s power system can be broken faster than Europe can help repair them.

Where Russia learned to aim

The pattern has changed. Between October 2025 and April 2026, almost 60% of verified Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy network hit smaller substations, compared with 31% the previous winter (The Washington Times). That matters because Ukraine has about 120 major high-voltage substations. They can be mapped, hardened and defended. The smaller distribution nodes run into the thousands. No air-defence umbrella can cover all of them.

Russia knows this grid well. Much of it is Soviet-era infrastructure, and Moscow has used that knowledge to separate generators from the networks they feed and to make repairs slower (IEA). OSW, the Polish security think tank, found that the 2025-26 heating season was the first in which Russia disrupted district-heating systems at scale, turning electricity cuts into failures of heat, water and sanitation (OSW). The campaign is no longer only about switching off lights. It is about making urban life harder to sustain.

The exchange is also widening. On 29 August, Zelenskyy ordered long-range drone strikes against Russia to be tripled to 1,000 a day (The Guardian). Ukrainian forces hit Russian refineries at least 21 times in August, including Kirishi near St Petersburg (NV). Moscow’s warning is retaliation, but it is also leverage ahead of winter.

Three tools, all with bottlenecks

Europe has three practical ways to help Ukraine get through another energy campaign. None is useless. None is enough on its own.

The first is electricity imports. Ukraine has been synchronised with the continental European grid since March 2022, which allows power to move across the Slovak, Hungarian, Romanian and Polish borders. In practice, Ukraine can buy and receive about 2.1 GW (Green Deal Ukraina). In February 2026, imports reached a record 1,262.8 GWh, using almost 90% of available capacity (DiXi Group). It is a real lifeline, but it has a ceiling. Imported electricity cannot replace destroyed power stations.

The second is the repair chain. The European Commission says earlier support delivered more than 7,000 transformers, six autotransformers, more than 11,000 generators and thousands of electrical components (European Commission, EEAS). On 24 August, the Commission approved €6.1 billion for Ukrainian air and missile defence (European Commission). But a June donor call acknowledged that the Ukraine Energy Support Fund was fully allocated, with unfunded winter needs of more than €650 million (energy.ec.europa.eu). The deeper problem is physical: large 330-750 kV transformers take 12-18 months to manufacture (DIIS). Funding can be approved in weeks. Working kit cannot.

The third is air defence, where the gap is largest. Zelenskyy said on 8 August that there was a US agreement for monthly Patriot interceptor deliveries, but that the volumes were not enough (Euromaidan Press). A Swedish-Danish short-range air-defence system is still 12 months away (regeringen.se).

The replacement race

The Nordic and Baltic response has been the most tangible. Sweden committed nearly SEK 1.5 billion (about €130 million) in June for Ukraine’s energy supply, through generators, batteries and IAEA nuclear-safety work (regeringen.se). Lithuania delivered 28.31 tonnes of grid equipment to Kyiv and Zhytomyr on 28 August, including transformers and surge-protection gear (Ukrainska Pravda, Censor.NET). Finland put €40 million into PURL, a NATO purchasing route that buys US-made air-defence equipment for Ukraine (defmin.fi).

Russia’s advantage is time. Europe can approve money faster than it can manufacture transformers or stretch air defence across thousands of small targets. If interceptors and grid hardware arrive before the sustained strikes begin, that advantage narrows. The production timelines suggest it will not narrow enough.