Serbia’s Refinery Hangs On US Waivers

Serbia’s petrol pumps are, for now, being kept open by a set of temporary permissions issued in Washington. On 28 and 29 August, the US Treasury’s sanctions office, OFAC, extended three separate licences that together allow Serbia’s only major refinery to keep operating, crude oil to keep moving through Croatia, and Hungary’s MOL group to keep negotiating with Russia over a majority stake in the business. All three permissions run out on 30 September (NIS, N1, Portfolio).

That can sound like one sanctions story. It is really three different legal switches, each controlling a different part of the supply chain. If any one of them is turned off, a different piece of Serbia’s oil system breaks.

Three Permissions, Three Pressure Points

The first licence is the one that keeps NIS, Serbia’s national oil company, alive as a business. It allows the company to import crude, refine it at Pančevo south of Belgrade, sell fuel, pay staff and settle transactions. The problem is ownership: NIS is majority-owned by Gazprom Neft, the Russian state-linked oil producer. That is enough to make banks, insurers and shipping companies wary, because dealing with a sanctioned entity can put their access to the US financial system at risk. Without the licence, payments do not move, and the refinery cannot operate (NIS, NIS).

The second licence belongs to JANAF, Croatia’s state-controlled Adriatic pipeline operator. JANAF is the physical route by which crude travels from the port of Omišalj to Pančevo. Its permission is tighter than NIS’s: the wording limits it to activities "customary and necessary" for transporting oil under its existing contract with NIS (Index.hr). When an earlier licence lapsed in late 2025, the flow was blocked for weeks (Bloomberg Adria).

The third licence is different again. It allows MOL, the Hungarian oil group, to keep talking to Gazprom Neft about buying the Russian-controlled 56.15% majority stake in NIS. It is a negotiating permit, not approval for a sale (Telex, Portfolio). MOL and Serbia signed a conditional shareholder agreement in June, under which Belgrade would lift its stake by 5 percentage points and gain blocking rights over key corporate decisions (Caliber, Telex). Until OFAC approves the actual sale, though, no shares move. The attraction is plain enough: MOL would add refining and retail weight in the region, while Serbia would swap out a Russian majority owner without surrendering all influence over the company.

Serbia Needs the Oil, Croatia Needs the Revenue

For Serbia, this is not an abstract sanctions problem. Pančevo supplies about 80% of the country’s fuel demand, and most of the crude reaches it through the JANAF line (Index.hr). NIS sold 3.023 million tonnes of petroleum products in 2025 and reported first-half 2026 net profit of 9.8 billion dinars (NIS IR, NIS IR). Serbian energy minister Dubravka Đedović Handanović has said the MOL-Gazprom Neft talks are in their "final phase" (Biznis.rs). Belgrade has sounded close to the finish before. It has also imposed a temporary export ban on oil products until 30 September, which tells you officials are guarding domestic supply while waiting to see what Washington does next (Newsmax Balkans).

Croatia has its own immediate reason to want the licence renewed. The NIS contract accounts for more than a third of JANAF’s revenue, according to the Croatian public broadcaster HRT (HRT). Prime minister Andrej Plenković has said a completed MOL-NIS deal would be "good for JANAF" because it would remove the sanctions problem at source (N1 Croatia). The longer-term calculation is trickier. JANAF earns because it is the route. If MOL ends up controlling NIS alongside Croatia’s INA and Slovakia’s Slovnaft, Hungary and Serbia may eventually have more reason to build an alternative pipeline, reducing Croatia’s leverage as a transit country (Večernji list).

Continuity Without Resolution

The pattern is now familiar. NIS was licensed to 20 March, then to 31 July, and now to 30 September. Each renewal keeps fuel moving and wages paid, but none of them forces Gazprom Neft out of control or settles the question of payment channels. Serbia’s case, like Bulgaria’s, shows how temporary licences can keep sanctioned refineries running for months while leaving the ownership problem untouched.

The permissions buy time. They do not transfer shares. MOL and OFAC are the two actors that can turn a licence to talk into a completed deal. Until that happens, Serbia’s fuel system depends on rolling US legal permission, one month at a time.