Sweden picks French frigates in €3.5 billion deal

Sweden has placed its largest defence order since the Gripen fighter, buying four frigates from France's Naval Group for about 40 billion SEK (~€3.5 billion). The deal gives three NATO navies a shared fleet of 13 identical warships. It was done directly between governments and companies, outside the EU defence procurement structures Brussels has spent years trying to build.

The offer no rival could match

Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson announced the order on 19 May. Naval Group beat Britain's Babcock, which had teamed up with Sweden's Saab, and Spain's Navantia. Defence Minister Pål Jonson pointed to delivery speed, proven technology, and the ability to share costs with France and Greece, which already operate the same ship (Theatrum Belli).

The FDI frigate had the advantage of being real, rather than promised. France commissioned its first hull in October 2025; Greece received the HS Kimon in December 2025. Swedish evaluators could board the vessel and see it working at sea. The rival bids could not offer that. Naval Group then made the offer harder to refuse by proposing to divert hulls from the French Navy's own production line so Sweden could meet its 2030 delivery target (Forum Militaire).

That is where ownership matters. The French state holds a majority stake in Naval Group. A listed company such as Babcock, already carrying heavy overruns on its Type 31 frigate for the Royal Navy, cannot easily match a state-backed rival prepared to rearrange its own navy's timetable to secure an export order.

Macron's sovereignty pitch

President Macron presented the sale as evidence of "a strong and sovereign Europe within NATO" (Économie Matin). It is a neat phrase, and a familiar one in Paris. The practical reality is simpler: a French state-backed company has sold French-designed warships, with production priority ultimately decided in France.

The EU's joint procurement fund, EDIP (the European Defence Industrial Programme, adopted December 2025), had no role in the deal. EDIP was created to encourage countries to buy defence equipment together, using EU money to pull national purchasing decisions into a common framework. Its first funding round, though, covers smaller kit such as drones and ammunition. Frigates are far beyond its reach. Sweden went bilateral because the bilateral route delivered.

By the end of 2025, Naval Group's order book had reached €32 billion, and the FDI platform now covers 13 frigates across three countries (Le JDD, Theatrum Belli).

The French hub

The FDI network does create cross-border work. Greek shipyards at Salamis have built hull blocks for both Greek and French frigates. Sweden will fit Saab weapons, including RBS15 anti-ship missiles and Giraffe radar, onto French hulls. But the structure is clear enough. France designs the platform, controls the production schedule, and owns the intellectual property. The partners add components around that centre.

Italy's absence tells its own story. Fincantieri did not bid. Its joint venture with Naval Group, Naviris, has underperformed; a French admiral said in early 2026 that it had "failed to meet expectations" (Forum Militaire).

Brussels wants collaborative procurement: countries pooling demand and spreading industrial returns across the bloc. Europe is instead getting a French-led network that keeps the spending inside EU borders while concentrating design authority and strategic leverage in Paris.

Denmark is reportedly considering its own frigate purchase. Thirteen ships across three navies already create a pull of their own, through shared spare parts, training systems and upgrade cycles. Each buyer makes the next one easier to persuade. For Copenhagen, the question is whether it would be joining a European defence programme or a French industrial bloc. The answer may be that, in this case, the two are becoming hard to separate.