Trump Weighs F-35s for Turkey

Washington’s safety pin remains in place, keeping Turkey’s regional ambitions on the tarmac.
Cumadóireacht íomhá · tobriefThe F-35 is a fighter jet, but in Washington it also works as a diplomatic lock. At the NATO summit, Donald Trump said he had not decided whether Turkey should be allowed back into the programme (USA Today, The Hill). The uncertainty suits him. Whoever controls access to the aircraft controls access to some of the alliance's most sensitive military technology.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned Kyriakos Mitsotakis not to "make the same mistake as Netanyahu" by opposing Turkey's return. Mitsotakis, careful not to sound as though Athens was dictating American arms policy, said Greece would not tell Washington where to sell weapons. But he also described Turkey's standing threat of war if Greece extends its Aegean territorial waters to 12 nautical miles as "an anachronism" (Euronews Greece). Both men were speaking past each other to the same listener. The decision is America's.
How the lock works
Greece is already inside the system. In January 2024, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Pentagon office that handles foreign arms sales, notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-35A aircraft to Athens (DSCA). Six months later, Greece signed the formal acceptance letter to join the programme (Lockheed Martin).
Turkey was pushed out for a very specific reason. In 2019, the Pentagon removed Ankara from the programme after it took delivery of Russia's S-400 air-defence system. The argument in Washington was not subtle: the F-35 "cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform" that could be trained to recognise the jet's stealth profile (Pentagon). The US then sanctioned Turkey's defence procurement agency under CAATSA, the American law that penalises major transactions with Russia's defence sector (State Department).
Trump can be warm towards Erdogan, and often is. But CAATSA is law, not mood. 18 members of Congress have publicly opposed Turkey's reinstatement, and a congressional resolution has been filed to block related transfers (Protothema, RIK). To reverse course, Washington would need either proof that the S-400 problem has been removed or a legislative workaround no administration has yet tried.
Why European capitals split
For Greece and Israel, Turkish F-35s are not an abstract NATO capability. They would alter the military balance close to home. Turkey still maintains its formal threat of war over the Aegean. Athens's argument is that giving the same stealth aircraft to a state making that threat weakens the logic of the programme itself. Benjamin Netanyahu has made a parallel case to Trump, warning that Turkish F-35s would shift the regional balance (n-tv, ZEIT).
Romania sees the question through the Black Sea. Bucharest works with Ankara and Sofia on mine countermeasures and protection of critical infrastructure (Digi24). From that angle, a Turkey tied more tightly to the West is a more useful partner against Russia.
Italy and Spain make the European picture messier. Leonardo operates the Cameri F-35 assembly plant in Italy and, in June 2025, launched a joint venture with Turkey's Baykar for unmanned systems (Leonardo, Leonardo-Baykar). Those industrial links give Rome a reason to keep Ankara close. Spain, meanwhile, plans to buy Turkish Hurjet trainers (Euronews Spain). Europe's own answer to the F-35, FCAS, the Franco-German-Spanish future combat air system, remains caught in industrial disputes (El País). Until it arrives, European governments are still relying on American aircraft and Turkish partnerships to cover the gaps.
Who holds the key
There are two gates between Turkey and the F-35. The White House must say the S-400 issue has been solved. Congress can then block or slow any sale. Trump controls the first gate, but the larger question is whether Turkey's geography and military weight are enough to justify bending American export-control law.
Athens, Jerusalem and 18 members of Congress are betting they are not. Ankara and parts of NATO's eastern flank are betting they are. Unless the S-400 physically leaves Turkish soil, the lock still holds.
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