Two Names Hold Up EU Sanctions

On 3 July, Bulgaria's prime minister, Rumen Radev, walked into parliament with a narrow demand that carried much wider force. Sofia would not support the EU's 21st sanctions package against Russia, he said, unless two names were removed from the blacklist: Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill and Vagit Alekperov, the businessman linked to Lukoil's Bulgarian refinery. Radev framed it as a matter of energy security and warned of disruption at the Burgas plant (BTA, European Pravda).

Two names out of hundreds should, in theory, be a detail. In EU sanctions law, it was enough to hold up the lot.

Foreign-policy sanctions need unanimity under the Treaty on European Union. All 27 governments must agree before a package is adopted (Council sanctions overview). The people and companies targeted are listed in annexes attached to the legal text, which means a government does not have to reject the whole sanctions framework. It can object to a single listing, and unanimity gives that objection the force of a veto.

How Sofia Held the File

By 9 July, Sofia was trying to soften the sound of what it was doing. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov went on Bulgarian television to say: "This is not a veto. These are reservations that we propose so that these individuals are removed from the sanctions regime" (Fakti).

The wording changed. The demand did not. Bulgaria still wanted Kirill and Alekperov taken off the list. What shifted was the political packaging: a veto became a reservation, and obstruction became the defence of a national interest.

The likely outcome is that the package passes without Kirill and Alekperov included. According to Pravda, diplomats expect the names to be quietly removed. Italy backed Bulgaria on Kirill, reportedly because the Vatican is uneasy about sanctioning the head of a Christian denomination (Euromaidan Press).

A Tactic Other Capitals Recognise

Slovakia's foreign minister, Juraj Blanár, called his Bulgarian counterpart and publicly endorsed Sofia's approach, saying the new government was "asserting its interests similarly to Slovakia" (Teraz). Hungarian media saw the episode through Budapest's own familiar playbook: use the threat of a veto to prise concessions from Brussels on EU funds or foreign policy (hir36).

There is no evidence of coordination between Sofia, Budapest and Bratislava. But Hungary has made the method visible. Use unanimity to force movement in Brussels, then show voters at home that you made Europe bend. Slovakia now presents Bulgaria's position as ordinary Council bargaining rather than obstruction (ta3).

That distinction matters. Once the tactic is treated as normal, the cost of using it falls.

Where the Package Bent

Bulgaria's fight over two names was only one pressure point. By the time ambassadors reached COREPER, the committee where each country's permanent representative negotiates before ministers make the formal decision, the sanctions package had turned into several bargains at once (Capital.gr, Kyiv Independent).

Greece, Cyprus and Malta pushed to shorten a freeze on Russia's oil price cap from six months to three or four. The cap allows Western shipping, insurance and financing services to handle Russian crude only if it sells below a fixed ceiling. The aim is to cut Moscow's revenue without jolting global supply (in.gr).

A shorter freeze matters because it could allow the cap to rise sooner, sending more oil income to Moscow (Pravda). Greece, Cyprus and Malta all have large maritime sectors exposed to the rules around shipping and services, so this was not an abstract legal dispute. Their commercial interests were in the room.

On another track, France and Italy forced the EU to narrow a proposed entry ban on Russian military veterans (Euronews). Disputes over Russian fish import quotas added another point of friction.

The lesson for every capital is straightforward: if a name, sector or industry is sensitive enough at home, it can be protected in the final hours of negotiation. The 21st package will probably pass. Its final shape, though, will show which governments had the strongest domestic reason to slow it down, rather than a shared view of what would put the most pressure on Moscow.

The sanctions regime can live with some bargaining. It cannot easily live with endless rounds in which the least willing capitals set the final terms. The European Council, where heads of state and government set the EU's direction, could revisit the unanimity rule for sanctions. No leader has proposed it.