US Bill Targets ASML China Servicing

The next front in the chip war runs through the Netherlands. ASML, the Dutch company that makes the only machines capable of producing the world’s most advanced semiconductors, is already caught between Dutch licensing rules and American pressure. A proposed US law would make that pressure harder and more permanent.

At issue is a basic question of sovereignty: who decides what ASML can sell, service and upgrade, The Hague or Washington?

What ASML Makes, and Why China Wants It

ASML builds lithography machines, the vast tools that use focused light to print tiny circuit patterns onto silicon wafers. Its most advanced systems use EUV, or extreme ultraviolet light. No other company makes them. Without EUV, chipmakers cannot produce the most powerful semiconductors.

That is why China wants access, and why the US wants to choke it off. China has been ASML’s fastest-growing market. Over the past three years, Chinese customers have generated roughly €27 billion for the company, according to industry tracking. Even after earlier US-led restrictions, China is still estimated to account for 19-20% of expected revenue (ad-hoc-news, Reuters).

That money explains why the MATCH Act matters. Introduced in the US House and Senate in April 2026, the bill would write broader American restrictions on semiconductor equipment sales to China into law (ChinaTalk, Broadband Breakfast). It has not passed. But Washington is already using it as leverage.

On 19 June, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick raised a more pointed claim directly with ASML: Washington believed one top EUV machine may have reached China. ASML rejected that, saying its global fleet of 314 operating EUV systems is tracked, with none in China (Reuters, Boursorama). No enforcement finding backs the allegation.

The Service Lever Is the Real Weapon

The legal reach comes through the Foreign Direct Product Rule. In plain terms, if a foreign-made product depends on specified American technology or equipment, the US can claim the power to restrict its sale. Because American components and intellectual property sit deep inside the global chip supply chain, the rule travels well beyond US borders (Handelsblatt, Techzine).

The MATCH Act would push further by targeting the servicing of machines already installed in Chinese factories. That is where the pain would really land. These machines need field engineers, spare parts, software updates and constant calibration. If calibration slips, factories get fewer usable chips from each wafer, and quality deteriorates quickly.

For ASML, this is not a side business. Installed-base service revenue reached about €8.2 billion in 2025, according to industry estimates (36Kr). A service ban would hit a recurring, high-margin revenue stream while gradually weakening Chinese chip production.

Who Loses in Europe

ASML’s China revenue does not simply sit in the Netherlands. It helps fund the research network linking ASML, Belgium’s imec institute and major chipmakers (imec). Cut that flow and Europe trims the very R&D base it is trying to strengthen through the European Chips Act (Akcie.cz).

Germany’s car industry gives the issue a second edge. Many automotive chips are made on older DUV, or deep ultraviolet, machines. They are less advanced than EUV systems, but they may also be caught by MATCH restrictions. If Chinese fabs lose access to DUV maintenance, supply could tighten for the mature chips used in cars, factory robots and industrial electronics. That would not automatically bring back the shortages of 2021-2023, but it raises the risk.

ASML’s own chief executive has warned that very harsh embargoes could backfire by pushing China to accelerate its own lithography programme rather than freezing it out (BFM Business). France has put the sovereignty point most bluntly: Europe can own a strategic champion and still lack control if the rules governing it are written in Washington (FrenchWeb).

Dutch Trade Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma travelled to Washington on 23 June to lobby against the MATCH Act, even as the Netherlands joined the US-led Pax Silica AI supply-chain initiative (Boursorama). That is the bind in one trip. The Netherlands cannot afford to step away from the US security relationship. But it cannot comfortably give Washington a veto over its most valuable company either. ASML matters because Europe owns it. The harder question is whether Europe can still decide what it does.