Pentagon Starts Europe's Six-Month Test

Six months is not long in defence planning. It is barely enough time to procure basic kit, never mind rebuild the machinery that has underpinned European security since the Cold War. Yet that is the timetable the Pentagon has set for deciding which American military functions in Europe remain and which are withdrawn.

Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told NATO ministers in June that some allies would fail the review while others would pass "with flying colours" (Stars and Stripes, Euronews). The issue is not simply how many US troops are stationed in Germany, Poland or Romania. It is whether Washington begins removing the command, intelligence, refuelling and nuclear functions that make NATO work before Europe has built anything credible to replace them. If that happens, deterrence weakens without anyone formally walking away from Article 5, NATO's mutual-defence clause.

What Washington Provides, What the Review Measures

Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top strategist, calls the shift "NATO 3.0": Europe takes over conventional defence, while America keeps its nuclear umbrella and redirects forces towards the Pacific (Washington Times, RFI). Put plainly, Washington wants European governments to defend their own territory with their own systems, and on a timetable they did not set.

The review will not be a simple headcount. It will examine whether allies can provide rapid access to bases and overflight rights during operations. That sounds procedural until a crisis arrives. A delayed permission from one capital can slow a reinforcement plan across several borders.

The harder truth is that the US still runs much of NATO's operating system. It provides the command structure that coordinates forces across borders, the intelligence that spots threats early, the tanker aircraft that keep jets flying, the strategic airlift that moves heavy equipment, and the nuclear-sharing arrangements that sit behind deterrence. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich commands both NATO's military operations in Europe and US European Command (Air & Space Forces Magazine). NATO planning still runs through American channels.

For Ireland, outside NATO but deeply tied to European security through the EU, this is not an abstract Brussels debate. Any weakening of European deterrence changes the assumptions behind EU defence discussions, including the ones Dublin has tried to manage carefully under the tradition of military neutrality.

Allies Are Upgrading the Pipes, Not the System

Europe has begun work on the physical side of defence. NATO members approved a €27 billion fuel-supply plan to push logistics capacity eastwards (NATO). Poland is linking radars and missile batteries into a single air-defence network, allowing operators to track threats and launch interceptors from one screen (Army Recognition). As To Brief reported, a German-led battle group recently tested an overnight heavy-armour move through Poland into Lithuania, exposing problems with border permissions and road capacity. From Lithuania's Suwałki corridor (15min) to Greece's logistics bases (US Embassy Greece), the eastern flank is being reinforced.

But roads, depots and fuel lines do not replace the system that tells forces where to go, when to move and what they are facing. Europe's shared refuelling fleet will eventually reach about a dozen tanker aircraft. Grynkewich has said that is not enough to sustain a war (Air & Space Forces Magazine). The EU Institute for Security Studies says European air-defence and surveillance capacity remains thin, held back by how quickly interceptors can be produced and stockpiled (EUISS).

The nuclear gap is the hardest one. France has opened a discussion about the role of its deterrent in European security, but it has not offered a funded replacement for the US-linked architecture (IFRI). Germany's purchase of F-35s for its nuclear-sharing mission reinforces dependence on American systems rather than replacing it (Simple Flying).

The pattern is visible across the flank states. Poland can host and move forces, but it cannot replace the command structure that coordinates them. Lithuania can receive a German brigade, but its deterrent value depends on air cover and reinforcement routes that do not yet operate at scale. Romania can protect fixed installations such as NATO's Aegis Ashore missile-defence site, but it cannot yet command a regional defence effort by itself.

The Clock Is Already Running

The Pentagon has already pulled 5,000 troops from Germany, including a long-range fires unit scheduled to deploy there, according to Stars and Stripes. Colby says the review will make NATO "stronger and more sustainable". Europe's own defence institutions point to a more awkward reality: the continent can pour concrete and lay fuel lines faster than it can build the command, intelligence and nuclear architecture that gives those assets military value.

That is the problem inside the six-month clock. Washington is asking Europe to take on more responsibility at exactly the moment when European planners describe the near term as a period of high vulnerability. Europe is improving the plumbing. The operating system is still American. Colby and Hegseth now have to answer the question raised by their own review: what happens in the gap between the timetable Washington is setting and the timetable Europe can actually meet?