Baltics Seek NATO Shoot-Down Powers

A Russian military aircraft entered Finnish airspace near Porkkala on 27 May, part of a pattern of violations that has nearly tripled in a single year. Finland’s defence ministry said the aircraft had likely crossed the line while avoiding thunderstorms.

Three days earlier, a Romanian F-16 shot down a drone over Estonia, the first time a NATO fighter destroyed an unmanned aircraft in Baltic skies. The day before that, NATO foreign ministers left a meeting in Helsingborg, Sweden, without a single operational decision on the crisis.

What "Air Defence" actually means

NATO has run Baltic Air Policing since 2004. It is a peacetime rotation in which allied fighter jets identify and escort unknown aircraft near Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which do not have fighter jets of their own. The current rotation includes French Rafales and Romanian F-16s at Šiauliai in Lithuania, and Portuguese F-16s at Ämari in Estonia.

On 21 May, the three Baltic presidents jointly demanded an upgrade: replace policing with a full Air Defence Mission (Aerotime). The difference is not cosmetic. Under the current system, a pilot must visually confirm an unknown aircraft before acting. An Air Defence Mission would set pre-defined threat zones where the military chain of command can authorise engagement without waiting for political approval each time.

That matters because small drones do not wait for procedure. A GPS-spoofed drone can cross a border and crash before a pilot completes the existing identification protocol.

The numbers explain the pressure. Confirmed Russian airspace violations across NATO rose from 6 in 2024 to 18 in 2025. In September 2025, three MiG-31 fighters flew 9-10 km into Estonian sovereign territory with their transponders off. Estonia then invoked Article 4, NATO’s formal consultation clause, one step below Article 5, the collective defence trigger (NATO North Atlantic Council).

For Malta, an EU state outside NATO, the distinction is still relevant. The Baltic question is being handled through NATO command structures, but the consequences sit inside the EU’s own security debate.

Who is steering the drones?

Helsingborg was meant to prepare the ground for decisions at NATO’s Ankara summit in July. Instead, it exposed a split over the basic diagnosis: is Russia deliberately pushing Ukrainian drones into allied territory?

Secretary General Mark Rutte referred to "jamming" and "other disturbances", language that leaves room for accidental drift. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna was more direct: "Russia is directing these drones to NATO territory" (Euromaidan Press, Pravda.com.ua).

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, speaking in Vilnius days later, called the incursions "a deliberate strategy from Russia". A Reuters analysis offered a third reading: that Ukraine deliberately flies drones near the border as a shield, calculating that Russia will not fire into NATO airspace (Reuters).

The legal problem is sharp. If NATO formally decides that Russia is using electronic warfare to push munitions into allied territory, the alliance moves closer to Article 5 questions it has not prepared to answer.

US Secretary of State Rubio made clear how limited the Helsingborg meeting was: "No concrete ask today... I don't think there's been any firm commitments or firm asks".

Frontline states are not waiting

Where NATO hesitates, individual allies are moving. Latvia deployed mobile drone-intercept units to its Russian border (Defense News). Lithuania’s president said the country will shoot down drones "regardless of missile costs".

The five Nordic nations signed a revised defence cooperation agreement on 6 May, formalising cross-border military movement and joint drone procurement for the first time since 2009 (NORDEFCO). Von der Leyen has proposed a "unified drone alert system" for the Baltic states, channelled through the EU rather than NATO.

NATO has not said whether the Romanian shoot-down marks a change in rules of engagement or a one-off authorisation. The next real decision point is the Ankara summit in July, where upgrading to an Air Defence Mission would require consensus from all 32 allies.

No government has publicly opposed the upgrade. The main friction may be structural rather than political. Germany’s constitution requires cabinet approval before the military shoots down aircraft. That makes it difficult for Berlin to accept standing pre-authorisation rules allowing commanders to act in the moment, which is exactly what an Air Defence Mission requires.