Belgium threatens frigate exit

Belgium's defence minister has given the Netherlands and shipbuilder Damen until October to rescue their joint frigate programme, or Belgium walks away. The cost per ship has reportedly more than doubled to around €1.3 billion (RTBF), while the first delivery has slipped to 2033 (Le Soir).

The project was meant to show that smaller NATO navies can buy smarter when they buy together. For Malta, where defence procurement is often about squeezing capability out of a limited budget, the lesson is familiar: cooperation only works if the smaller partner knows exactly who controls the contract when things go wrong.

Who runs the contract, who just pays

The Belgian-Dutch naval partnership splits responsibility by ship type. Belgium leads the replacement of minehunters. The Netherlands leads the replacement of frigates. The lead country manages the industrial relationship, runs the contract, and handles the daily decisions. The partner country pays its share and receives the ships, but it is not the one sitting across the table from the shipyard.

That arrangement is fine while the programme is on time and on budget. The Belgium-led minehunter track has not produced the same rupture: the vessel Tournai is preparing for sea trials, and older ships are already being transferred to Bulgaria (Army Recognition, Baird Maritime). Twelve vessels, built by Naval Group, are on schedule (Naval Group).

The Dutch-led frigate track has broken down. In June 2023, the Dutch ministry signed a contract with Damen for four anti-submarine frigates, two for each navy (Dutch Defence).

What went wrong, and what it costs

NRC reports a basic design failure. The weapons and sensors no longer fit the planned hull. A larger hull then changes propulsion, stability and cost. The ship grew, and the budget followed.

The price is politically dangerous. Minister Theo Francken says costs have risen from roughly €600 million per ship. Belgian outlets report that the figure could reach €1.8 billion in 2022 prices (RTBF). These are ministerial claims and press reports, not audited contract values. Even on the lower estimates, however, the bill has doubled.

A 2033 delivery also creates a capability gap. Belgium's ageing Leopold I and Louise-Marie frigates could retire before replacements arrive. Around 2030, Belgium may have no deployable escort ship at all, just as NATO is asking European navies for more anti-submarine capacity in the Atlantic and the North Sea.

The market is not empty, but available capacity is

Francken says he wants alternative offers from French, German, Spanish, Italian and Turkish yards by October. France's Naval Group has its FDI frigate in serial production, but its Lorient yard is booked into 2034 (franceinfo). Spain's Navantia has just laid the third keel for its F-110 class, but those ships are still entering Spanish service (La Voz de Galicia).

Across Europe, frigate yards have full order books. The shortage is not of designs, but of production slots.

Leaving carries risks of its own. Germany recently cancelled its own frigate programme with Damen as prime contractor and shifted towards competitor TKMS. That move has already triggered accusations of wrongful termination and possible claims running into the billions (Zeit, NZZ). Cancelling a defence contract is rarely a clean reset. It can become a legal dispute that lasts for years.

The trap

Belgium now has three poor choices. Stay with Damen and absorb the overruns, plus the frigate gap. Leave and face termination costs, lost work, and another supplier's queue. Or use alternative offers as leverage, hoping the Netherlands can force Damen back into line.

Nobody has publicly shown how much of the failure belongs to Damen, how much to Dutch programme management, and how much to changing Belgian-Dutch requirements. Without that breakdown, the October decision is being made partly in the dark.

The minehunter programme shows that joint procurement can work. The frigate programme shows the condition: both partners need to know who can stop the contract, who pays when it slips, and what happens if the lead country loses control. Belgium did not secure those answers. Every European government now pushing pooled defence buying should ask Francken's question before signing, not after.