Belgium Shields Euroclear’s €193 Billion

Belgium's defence minister closed the door on 28 August to a renewed push to use frozen Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine. The reason is not sympathy for Moscow or fatigue with Kyiv. It is liability. No EU government has yet offered to cover the legal and financial risk that lands in Brussels because that is where most of the money is held.

Two days earlier, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain had written to EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas, asking the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, to examine ways of using immobilised Russian assets beyond taking the profits they generate (Government of the Netherlands, Reuters/WTVB). Defence Minister Theo Francken replied that Prime Minister Bart De Wever would not move (Nieuwsblad). Belgium's answer is easier to understand once the question is put plainly: who pays if Russia sues, retaliates, or wins judgments against the institution holding the assets?

Euroclear carries Europe's exposure

Euroclear, the Brussels-based company that holds and settles securities for banks and governments around the world, sits on roughly €185–193 billion of the EU's approximately €210 billion in immobilised Russian central-bank assets (Meduza, Commonspace). That concentration turns a European policy debate into a Belgian balance-sheet problem. If the EU moves from using the income produced by the assets to touching the assets themselves, Belgium and Euroclear are first in line for Russian legal action and retaliation.

The pressure is not theoretical. Le Monde has reported roughly 200 legal proceedings against Euroclear and nine arbitration notifications against Belgium (Le Monde). According to Ellipsis Avocats, a Moscow court has ordered Euroclear to pay nearly $250 billion. That judgment cannot be enforced inside the EU, but it shows the scale at which Russia is prepared to escalate (Ellipsis Avocats).

The current arrangement still functions. The EU takes the interest and investment proceeds generated by the frozen assets, not the assets themselves. On 5 August, it transferred another €1.4 billion to Ukraine, bringing total proceeds to about €8 billion (European Commission). But the four-country letter argues that the EU's €90 billion loan for 2026–2027, backed by the bloc's common budget, will not be enough. Their point is that a larger mechanism using the frozen principal could give Ukraine financing it can rely on beyond the next tranche (Euractiv).

Everyone wants the money, nobody wants the bill

Belgium's position is conditional, not categorical. Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot said during an August visit to Kyiv that Belgium had no principled objection to using the assets, provided the legal and financial risks were shared by all member states through binding guarantees (Kyiv Independent). The four-country letter accepts that logic, asking for options where "risk rests with all EU member states" (Government of the Netherlands). What it does not provide is the mechanism Belgium wants: unconditional, uncapped guarantees that would stand up legally and politically when the bill arrives (Euronews).

That gap between solidarity and fiscal commitment is visible across the bloc. Poland's Radosław Sikorski said Warsaw was "ready to participate in insuring Belgium," but Polish reporting found no public legal formula for an uncapped indemnity (Radio ZET). Germany's Friedrich Merz argued that risks should be divided according to economic size, though not as a blank cheque. German reporting estimated Berlin's share in such a guarantee could exceed €50 billion (Bundesregierung, FAZ). France and the Netherlands support the principle, but have not accepted unlimited liability (Ouest-France, Tweede Kamer).

Francken also sent a pointed message to the Baltic states, telling them not to keep cornering Belgium while Belgium contributes to their security through NATO Baltic Air Policing, according to Nieuwsblad. The meaning was clear enough for any small member state, Malta included: European solidarity cannot mean one capital takes the political credit while another carries the exposure.

The issue was expected to return around the 1–2 September informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ireland. The Commission says it has "never taken the issue off the agenda" (Commission briefing). But the coalition in favour of using Russian assets is still larger than the coalition willing to underwrite Belgium's full liability. Until member states put a legally binding EU-wide guarantee behind Euroclear's exposure, Belgium's refusal is not obstruction. It is the cost of hosting the financial infrastructure everyone else wants to turn into a war-funding instrument.