Berlin, Warsaw fight over €6.6bn

Hungary has lifted its veto on €6.6bn in EU military funds for Ukraine. That did not settle the argument. It moved it to the harder question: should the money repay governments that already sent weapons to Kyiv, or should it buy new equipment for Ukraine now?

A Fund That Can't Cover Its Own Promises

The European Peace Facility is an EU fund outside the normal budget, because the treaties do not allow the Union to finance military spending directly. Member states pay into it, send weapons to Ukraine bilaterally, then claim partial reimbursement from the common pot (Eur-Lex).

For Malta, this is the familiar EU problem in miniature: solidarity is agreed in Brussels, but the bill is carried nationally. Hungary blocked the fund for more than two years. When Budapest withdrew its veto in early June, the money became available. The claims waiting in the queue, however, total about €43bn (Brussels Signal). The fund usually covers about 40% of the value of transfers (Ground, Arab News/AFP). Even that share is now beyond reach.

Kaja Kallas, the EU foreign-policy chief, has proposed splitting the money three ways: some reimbursement for member states, new joint procurement for Ukraine, and funding for EUMAM Ukraine, the EU military training mission. Reporting puts the proposed figures at €900m for training, €1bn for procurement, and €4.7bn for payouts to member states (EEAS, Babel).

Who Pays for Going First

Germany wants the money to produce immediate military value for Ukraine. Defence State Secretary Sebastian Hartmann said EPF returns not used at once should still support Ukraine. A day later, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius pledged another €300m to the Czech ammunition initiative, a channel designed to create new deliveries rather than compensate old ones (BMVg).

Poland reads the matter differently. Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk said Warsaw wants full repayment of about €450m for weapons already delivered (RMF24). Expected reimbursement rates have reportedly fallen from about 84% to 46%, and may fall further if the new allocation is squeezed (Censor). These are bargaining figures, not final rates. They still explain Warsaw's anger.

Slovakia shows that the complaint is not Polish theatre. Bratislava donated MiG-29 fighter jets and an S-300 air-defence system under the previous government, a package valued at about €700m. So far, it has received just €92m from the EPF (Bankier). Officials expected roughly €250m. They may now receive about a tenth of that (Denník N). Prime Minister Robert Fico said he would confront Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over money he argues was redirected from donor reimbursements to direct Ukraine spending (Aktuality.sk).

Two Logics, One Fund

Sweden is also waiting for EPF money, but frames Ukraine aid as a long-term security necessity rather than a reimbursement dispute (GP). Nordic states broadly supported Germany's line at the defence ministers' meeting (RBC Ukraine).

The division is clear. One side treats the EPF as a burden-sharing contract: countries that emptied their stocks for Ukraine should be repaid according to the bargain they were offered. The other treats it as a wartime instrument: money should go where it gives Ukraine the most immediate battlefield effect.

Both arguments are serious. Ukraine needs air defence and ammunition now, and new procurement delivers equipment in a way reimbursement does not (EEAS). But Poland and Slovakia moved early on the understanding that Europe would share the cost. Changing the terms afterwards weakens the incentive for any member state to move first next time.

No final allocation table has been published. Kallas's plan remains a proposal, not an agreed formula (Tagesschau). The question for the next round is simple enough: if Europe wants rapid military support for Ukraine, why make the fastest movers absorb the discount?