Dutch Mission Tackles China Trade Gap

Sjoerdsma went to Beijing to cool a relationship that has become too important to leave on autopilot. The Netherlands sent its first ministerial commercial mission to China since 2018, EFE reported via Infobae, after the Nexperia dispute exposed the real location of Europe’s China risk: not in diplomatic language, but in the small components that keep factories running.

Nexperia is a Dutch chipmaker owned by China’s Wingtech. Its parts are used in cars, industrial equipment and electronics, The Economist reported. Control over such a company is not only about who owns the sign outside the building. If The Hague prevents production know-how or strategic decisions from moving to China, Beijing can still put pressure on the supply of parts that European manufacturers need every day.

Cheap Parts Can Carry A High Cost

The trade figures explain why this is so difficult. DW and CNBC cited 2025 numbers showing about €199.6 billion in EU exports to China and about €559.4 billion in imports from China, leaving a goods deficit of around €359.8 billion (DW, CNBC). A goods deficit is simply the gap between what Europe sells and what it buys. It does not prove foul play, but it does show how many European business models now rely on Chinese supply.

The issue becomes sharper when those imports are batteries, chips, magnets, steel, solar equipment and machinery. Cheap Chinese production lowers costs for European buyers today. It also takes orders away from European producers. When factories receive fewer orders, they invest less and spread fixed costs, such as plant and equipment, over fewer units. They become more expensive just when Europe says it wants them to scale up.

That is why the Dutch trip matters beyond a calmer meeting between The Hague and Beijing. The Netherlands needs open trade because ports, logistics and high-tech suppliers sit at the centre of its economic model. Malta knows a version of this dilemma. A small, open economy can live well from being connected, but it also becomes exposed when the rules of connection are written elsewhere.

Brussels, meanwhile, needs pressure it can actually use. That means tariffs, the taxes charged on imports, and subsidy investigations, which examine whether state support allows firms to sell below the real cost faced by their rivals. These tools are blunt, but they are among the few levers the EU has when market access and industrial dependence become the same question.

The Same Calm Helps And Hurts

Germany shows why calmer ties still have value. Its carmakers and machinery firms use China both as a market and as a source of parts and materials. At the same time, Chinese firms now compete directly with them in electric cars, batteries and industrial equipment. Porsche’s China sales fell 28% in 2024, Automobil Produktion reported, while Reuters/MarketScreener cited an EU-funded chip report warning that Europe depends on China for critical materials and on the US for key technologies (MarketScreener).

German industry benefits when parts continue moving. It loses if cheap imports make European factories, suppliers and skills less viable over time. Calm protects the present business model. It can also postpone the work needed to reduce dependence.

Poland shows the pressure on producers more plainly. Rzeczpospolita, citing GUS, reported 2025 exports of 13.2 billion zloty to China and imports of 232.4 billion zloty from China. Business Insider, citing Eurostat, put Poland’s negative balance with China in the first quarter of 2026 at €8 billion, around 3.75% of quarterly GDP, meaning the economy’s output for that quarter (Rzeczpospolita, Business Insider). Cheap Chinese inputs can keep costs down for factories in Poland, Czechia or Slovakia. Cheap finished goods can also undercut local makers of parts, appliances, steel and batteries.

Europe Still Wants Chinese Speed

Spain explains why Europe cannot simply close the door. Gotion’s Valladolid battery project received €138.2 million from Spain’s PERTE VEC programme, while claims of about €950 million in investment and work starting in 2027 remain project announcements, El País and Castilla y León Económica reported. Chinese investment is attractive when Europe wants battery factories quickly. The risk is that Europe hosts the plant while the key decisions on chemistry, software and sourcing remain elsewhere.

Sjoerdsma’s mission helps if it gives Europe time to decide where Chinese supply is useful and where control becomes dangerous. It becomes costly if each exposed capital cuts its own arrangement: Dutch logistics, German cars, Polish factories, Spanish batteries. Beijing does not need a formal trade war if it can offer calm where Europe needs parts, investment where Europe needs factories, and pressure where one government blocks a deal.

For Malta, the lesson is familiar. EU trade policy is not distant Brussels theatre; it is the framework within which small economies choose their risks. Europe’s question is whether temporary quiet with Beijing becomes common bargaining power, or whether dependence is broken into separate deals that leave each member state negotiating from its own weak spot.